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THE 1989 U.S.-ROC (TAIWAN) FISHERIES NEGOTIATIONS 
by Mark Mon-Chang Hsieh* 
Introduction 
The sea is the source and the provider of life. Life evolved from 
the sea and lived off the sea. Mankind fishes from the sea, sails on the 
sea, and mines from the sea. Seventy percent of the Earth's surface is 
covered by water. Eighty percent of the Earth's animal life lives in the 
sea. 1 Of the 163 nation-states in the world, 118 of them have some 
kind of a coastline. Before the twentieth century, nations viewed the 
sea as a global common with inexhaustible resources. The 17th cen-
tury Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in his work, Mare Liberum (Freedom 
of the Sea), captured this belief. Grotius, dubbed the father of interna-
tional law declared in his work that the air and ocean, made by Na-
ture, are res nullius (belonged to no one) or res communis (belonged to 
everyone), and ought to be as they were made, free. 2 Moreover, for 
Grotius, the oceans are "forever bountiful and forever inexhaustible." 
Thus, man can use the sea and its resources at his will. 
Since Grotius, however, the status of the sea has changed. With 
increased global interdependence and advances in transportation, 
questions concerning territorial seas and the freedom of navigation 
have become topics of debate. With technological advances in fishing 
and discoveries of mineral deposits in seabeds, the global community 
has become increasingly anxious over the unregulated use of the sea. 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea began in 
1973 and specifically tried to resolve these problems within a legal 
context. After countless meetings and compromises, the Conference 
finally adopted, in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (LOS Convention)- which as of 1985, 159 nations had al-
• In 1989, Mr. Hsieh undertook this study as his undergraduate honors project at 
Wesleyan University ( Middletown, CT). Professor Guilio Gallarotti of Wesleyan Univer· 
sity supervised Mr. Hsieh's research. With a B.A. in Government, Mr. Hsieh is presently 
persuing a two year M.I.A. (Master of International Affairs) at Columbia University 
School of International and Public Affairs in New York. 
1. David L. Larson, Major Issues of the Law of the Sea, Durham, New Hampshire: 
The University of New Hampshire, 1976, p. 1. 
2. Hamilton Vreeland, Hugo Grotius, New York: Oxford University Press, 1917, p. 
55. 
(1) 
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ready signed. 3 The law deviated drastically from Grotius's views. In 
term of resources, this LOS Convention was adopted on the premise 
that the marine resources are exhaustible and the sea, if over exploited, 
may not always be bountiful. Grotius believed that the sea belonged 
to no one. The LOS Convention however permitted the allocation of 
thirty-six percent.4 of the sea as Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) to 
the coastal nations. The LOS Convention reduced the marine global 
common by carving the sea into private pieces for individual nations. 
The sea is no longer free, and as a result, disputes over resource alloca-
tion has increased over the years. 
Fishery issues took the center stage during the drafting of the 
LOS Convention. Due to conflicting interests, however, the resulting 
articles in LOS Convention regarding marine resources were ambigu-
ous. The law, for instance, stated in Article 87 the freedom to fish on 
the high seas (international waters). Yet, in Article 66, it disallowed 
non-origin nations from harvesting anadromous fish, which can be 
found in the high seas. Aware of the weaknesses of the law, the draft-
ers advocated cooperative efforts among all resource-users in utilizing 
and conserving the available resources. It requested that the coastal 
nations allocate the resources, which it alone can not fully-utilize, to 
other countries. 5 
The idealism of the LOS Convention has not reduced the 
problems in the ocean fisheries. Despite the LOS Convention's pro-
motion for cooperation among nations, most nations are only con-
cerned with their individual benefits. For them, preservation of 
resources for domestic use greatly overshadowed any schemes of re-
source allocation to others. To further aggravate the situation, with 
more efficient fishing techniques, the ocean resources are being de-
pleted rapidly. A pur seiner vessel fishing for tuna, for instance, can 
catch up to 350 metric tons of fish in just one net set. 6 The combina-
tion of dwindling resources and the "privatization" of the global com-
mon has forced nations to compete aggressively in various ocean 
fisheries. This unregulated competition has in tum, created numerous 
international fishery disputes over the years. 
3. Henry W. Degenhardt, Maritime Affairs A World Handbook, Detroit: The Gale 
Research Company, 1985, p. 4. 
4. David L. Larson, Major Issues of the Law of the Sea, supra, note 1, p.l. 
5. Hsieh Ta-wen, Hai-yang hsin chih-hsu yu kuo-chi yu-ye kuan-hsi (The New Sea 
Order and International Fishery Management), Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Conference on "From 
International Law of the Seas to the North Pacific Salmon Problem." pp. 48-50. 
6. Luther L. Carter, "Law of the Sea: Fisheries Plight Poses Dilemma for the United 
States, "Science, No. 185, (July 26, 1974), p. 338. 
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In 1989, one of the major fishing issues in the United States was 
the use of driftnets in the high seas of the Pacific Ocean. Environmen-
talists argued that the nets were "stripmining" the ocean. The salmon 
industry, on the other hand, claimed that the nets were used to poach 
North American salmon. The United States, concerned with the use 
of this technology, entered into a series of negotiations with the 
driftnet nations of Japan, South Korea, and the ROC on Taiwan. The 
goal of these negotiations was to establish agreements with these na-
tions in regulating their driftnet fleets and to prevent further intercep-
tion of North American salmon. After six months of consultations, on 
August 26, 1989, the ROC on Taiwan's Coordination Council for 
North American Affairs (CCNAA) reluctantly signed a fishery agree-
ment with the United States' American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). 7 
The agreement was far from cooperative. It placed numerous responsi-
bilities on the ROC on Taiwan and further restricted her fishery opera-
tions in the North Pacific. The ROC on gave in to virtually every U.S. 
demand and, as a result, the ROC government came under severe crit-
icism at home. A study of the negotiation uncovered that in the 
United States, the various lobbying forces contributed to the 
adamancy of the U.S. negotiation stand. As for the ROC, her capitu-
lation in this fishery talks was mainly the result of her dependency on 
the United States as an ally and trade partner. In addition, the ROC 
on Taiwan's insecurity over her diplomatic isolation and domestic 
pressure posed further disadvantages in her negotiations. Finally, the 
lack of coordination among the ROC government agencies, and with 
the domestic fishing industry prevented her from negotiating effec-
tively with the thoroughly prepared United States. 
The first section of this study presents the background informa-
tion on the negotiation. It conveys briefly the history of fishery rela-
tions between the ROC and the United States. It then proceeds to 
describe the salmon habitat and harvesting conditions, and docu-
ments, in some detail, the poaching problem in the North Pacific. 
Lastly, the section looks at the driftnet technology, the development of 
the North Pacific driftnet fishery, and the dire consequences of 
driftnetting. 
Following the background information, section two synthesizes 
and analyzes the dynamics of the driftnet/salmon issue in the United 
States. It looks specifically at the rise of the environmental movement 
7. Chiu Hungdah," The Legal Status of the Republic of China," in Hungdah Chiu, 
ed., Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Vol. 8 ( 1988-1989), Baltimore, 
Maryland: Chinese Society of International Law, p. 1. 
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in America, the economic importance of the salmon industry, the U.S. 
overall negotiation strategy to use the ROC on Taiwan as a precedent, 
and the efforts of the anti-driftnet lobby. The section concludes that of 
all the factors, the lobbying forces appeared to have the most impact in 
shaping the U.S. negotiating stand and in maintaining the publicity 
over the issue. 
In understanding the U.S. position on the driftnet/salmon issue, 
the study turns now to the ROC side of the negotiation. Section three 
summarizes the main points of the 1989 fishing agreement and illus-
trates the negative impact it has on the ROC. After highlighting the 
weaknesses of the 1989 agreement, the section asks the question," how 
could the ROC have negotiated a more favorable agreement?" It then 
speculates possible strategies and compromises the ROC on Taiwan 
could have used in these negotiations. The proposals includes joint-
ventures, an international fishery management regime, a global 
driftnet conference, joint-negotiation with Japan, joint monitorship, 
and cooperative training programs. 
Section four of this study asks why the ROC did not try harder in 
the negotiation. Why did she fail to explore other options with the 
United States? The dismal result of the negotiation suggests a con-
strained ROC negotiation team. The section probes the factors which 
influenced the ROC's negotiating stands, and how these factors re-
stricted the negotiators' options. Some of these factors are the depen-
dency of the ROC on the United States, ROC's insecurity over her 
diplomatic isolation, domestic pressure on the sovereignty issue, 
ROC's concern over her international image and the absence of a rea-
sonable and coherent negotiation strategy. 
The ROC on Taiwan failed in this round of negotiation. In fact, 
the ROC on Taiwan, despite her increased economic strength, is still 
confronting difficulties in international negotiations. Section five in-
vestigates the possibility of track two diplomacy. The section first de-
scribes what track two entails and looks at how ROC's flourishing 
private sector could perform track two diplomacy for the government. 
Section five then speculates on how track two diplomacy might have 
bettered the outcome of the 1989 fishery negotiation. 
This study concentrates on the U.S. domestic politics and the 
ROC's foreign policymaking. The author looks at how domestic lob-
bying and the constituent- conscious Congress in the United States can 
drastically alter governmental negotiation strategies and aims. The 
study then, looks at the U.S.- ROC negotiation in the context of a 
strong-weak country negotiation and sifts out the major constraints on 
the ROC in such situation. Despite the ROC's inferiority, the author 
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explores the options that the ROC has or can develop in order to nego-
tiate more effectively even under such adverse conditions. 
Section 1: Salmon Poaching and Driftnet Fishing 
The United States and the ROC have long nurtured a close 
friendship. Even after its de jure recognition of the Beijing government 
as the sole representation of China, the United States has continued to 
treat Taiwan, formerly recognized by the United States as the Repub-
lic of China, as an independent state through the Taiwan Relations 
Act. In the absence of official diplomatic ties, the United States and 
the ROC respectively established the American Institute in Taiwan 
(AIT) and the Coordinating Council for North American Affairs 
(CCNAA). 8 These institutions have performed as de facto diplomatic 
missions and have provided the forum for discussion and exchange. 
Despite the two countries' close ties, conflicting interests in the last 
few years have strained the their normally congenial relationship. The 
long-standing dispute over fishing between the ROC on Taiwan and 
the United States resulted in the 1989 AIT-CCNAA Fisheries Negoti-
ations. On the ROC side, the negotiations provided significant in-
sights into her foreign policymaking. On the American side, the 
negotiations exemplified the prowess of effective lobbying. 
The ROC values her fishery industries. In addition to a strong 
domestic demand for fish, the ROC also exported $1.68 billion worth 
of fishery products in 1988. The ROC's fishing vessels have operated 
for years in distant ocean fisheries around the world in order to meet 
these demands. A substantial portion of ROC's vessels have operated 
either within the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or near the 
U.S. coastal waters. In response to these fisheries operations, the two 
countries have, since the mid-1970's, twice signed treaties and in the 
process, have carried out numerous consultations. While the 1989 
AIT-CCNAA Fishing Agreement was not the first bilateral fishing ac-
cord between the two countries, it was the first one to specifically tar-
get the use of driftnets and the interception of the North American 
salmon. In 1977, when the ROC was still recognized as the Republic 
of China, the two countries signed the Governing International Fish-
ery Agreement (GIFA).9 At that time the United States also negoti-
ated a series of similar GIFA's with the other countries whose fishing 
8. Republic of China: A Reference Book, Taipei: Government Information Office, Re-
public of China, May 1983, p. 293. 
9. Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, 
"Department Reviews Developments in International Fisheries Policy," Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol. 76, (February 28, 1977), pp. 175-177. 
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vessels operated in the American 200-mile EEZ. These GIFA's re-
flected an American effort, in accordance with the Magnuson Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (MFCMA), to 'Ameri-
canize' her fisheries. 10 These agreements essentially gave the United 
States complete jurisdiction over her EEZ, and allowed her to manage 
and self-utilize her fisheries resources. In 1982 the two countries, now 
represented by AIT and CCNAA, signed another similar fisheries 
agreement. In this agreement, however, the Americans specifically re-
quested the cooperation of CCNAA to assist U.S. enforcement officials 
to board and to inspect ROC vessels. Although the 1982 AIT-
CCNAA Fishery Agreement expired in 1987, the two countries 
agreed to abide by the agreement until another fishing agreement was 
ratified 11 • 
The restrictions placed on foreign fishing in the American EEZ 
through the MFCMA, forced the ROC to seek alternative fishing 
grounds in international waters, or sometimes called, the high seas. 
While the 1982 fishery agreement was still in effect, the development 
of a ROC high sea squid fleet of 146 vessels in the North Pacific raised 
much American anxiety (see map A). After receiving reports that the 
ROC fleet had been poaching salmon on the high seas, the United 
States asked the ROC authorities to regulate their own fleet in the 
North Pacific. The request resulted in the "ROC North Pacific Squid 
Fleet Operational Regulations," which forbade any ROC fisherman 
from harvesting salmon. 12 Because salmon and squid resided in dif-
ferent water temperatures, this operational regulation established sea-
sonal restrictions according to the seasonal water temperature in the 
North Pacific. These boundaries in effect separated the squid fishery 
from the salmon migration path, thus, decreasing the rate of salmon 
bycatches (see map B). In 1983, the ROC government also placed a 
ban on the export of salmon. This ban was followed soon after by a 
Japanese ban on imports of salmon from the ROC. Strong U.S. diplo-
matic pressure had forced the ROC to legislate these domestic regula-
tions to deter both the fishermen and the entire industry from profiting 
in salmon piracy. During the 1989 fishery negotiations, the ROC ves-
sels were thus still required to abide by the 1982 bilateral agreement, 
10. Edward E. Wolf, "U.S. Responsibilities in International Fisheries Matters," De-
partment of State Bulletin, Vol. 89, (July 1989), p. 56. 
11. Phone interview with Professor Fu kuen-chen, National Taiwan University, Au-
gust 20, 1989. 
12. Kuo Tsung-hai, Wuo-kuo kung-hai liou-wan yu-ye kuan-li chi tan- t'ou (A Study of 
the Nation's Management of its High Sea Driftnet Industry), Taipei: Fisheries Section, 
Council of Agriculture. p. 2. 
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the domestic North Pacific operational regulations, and the salmon 
export bans. 
The 1989 AIT-CCNAA fisheries negotiations were carried out 
pursuant to the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assessment and Control 
Act of 1987 (The Driftnet Act)Y This act required the Secretary of 
Commerce, with the assistance of the Secretary of State, to negotiate 
cooperative agreements with those countries which maintain high seas 
driftnet fisheries that take U.S. marine resources in the North Pacific 
Ocean. The focus of the negotiations came to rest upon two major 
issues: the high sea interception of salmon and the use of driftnets. 
Although these two issues are clearly related, for the purpose of clar-
ity, each issue is discussed separately. 
Salmon Poaching 
Though only one of the many species of fish found on the high 
seas, salmon is politically controversial because of its unique life cycle. 
Salmon is high in monetary value and has a unique migratory lifestyle. 
Throughout its life cycle, a salmon crosses over and back national 
boundaries, moves among territorial waters, and may travel thousands 
of miles from its birthplace. This lifecycle begins with the deposition 
and fertilization of eggs in a freshwater river or stream. After birth, a 
six-inch 'smolt' eventually swims out into the ocean, where it will 
spend the rest of its life until time of reproduction. At such time, the 
fish returns to its home stream or river, reproduces, and then dies. 
The ability of salmon to adjust to both salt and fresh water and its 
ability to find the home river are still mysteries. However, the 
salmon's changing habitat has made the ownership of this fish ex-
tremely controversial. Some countries have argued that because 
salmon spends most of their lifecycles in the ocean, they should be 
considered public goods available to all states. A different set of coun-
tries, consisting of states where salmon are spawned rejected that argu-
ment. They responded instead that salmon should be considered 
private goods from where they originated. The salmon habitat 
strained the concept of the global common and made the ownership 
question a continual problem. 14 
There are salmon in both the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific 
13. "Report of the Secretary of Commerce to the Congress of the United States on the 
Nature, Extend and Effects of Driftnet Fishing in the Water of the North Pacific Ocean 
Persuant to Section 4005 of Public Law 100-200, the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assess· 
ment and Control Act", Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1988. 
14. Daniel Jack Chasan, "Salmon, Bitter Fruit of Pacific," Audobon, Vol. 77, (Novem-
ber 1975), pp. 8-11. 
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Ocean. Nevertheless, the Pacific Ocean produces over ninety percent 
of the overall catch. Pacific salmon, are subdivided between those 
which origined in Asia and those from North American. Xn North 
America the salmon habitat ranges on the west coast from northern 
California to the Arctic Circle and as far inland as the mountains of 
Idaho. In the ocean, salmon are found in water temperatures ranging 
between one and fifteen degree Celsius, with the heaviest concentra-
tion in the two to twelve degree range. There are six species of Pacific 
salmon, each with a different population, distribution, life cycle, mi-
gration path, and appearance (see Appendix 1). The pink salmon, the 
most abundant of all Pacific salmon, are found from northern Califor-
nia to the Aleutian Islands. They are unique in that they mature after 
spending two summers and one winter in the ocean, resulting in yearly 
variable populations. The Chum salmon, the second most abundant, 
are found from northern California to the Mackenzie River in Canada. 
The Sockeye salmon, the most valuable of all the Pacific salmon, are 
found from Northern California to Point Hope, Alaska. The Chinook 
salmon, the largest, yet least abundant, of all Pacific salmon, are found 
from central California to Northwest Alaska and have the longest mi-
gration path up to 3000 miles. The last two types of salmon are the 
Coho and the Masou. Cohos are found from Northern California to 
Northwest Alaska. Masous, on the other hand, are only found in Japa-
nese waters. The numerical distribution of these salmon in the East-
ern Pacific region are as follow: Pink 48 percent, Sockeye 25 percent, 
Chum 12 percent, Coho 10 percent, and Chinook 5 percent. The 
ocean-bound salmon are found northwest of 40 degrees North and 135 
degrees West, an area 3000 miles in length and 1000 miles in width. 15 
The salmon's habitat made the management and harvest of this 
fish extremely controversial. Should the fish be treated as a common 
good like the other fish in the ocean or should those countries in 
which salmon origined have sole ownership of the fish. In the Pacific, 
four countries, Canada, Japan, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, constitute these salmon-origin countries. However, Japan har-
vests not only Asian salmon, but also North American salmon. This 
issue thus sparked a North American effort at the Third United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, to regain control of its salmon 
stocks. At the Law of the Sea Caracas session, the U.S. delegation 
circulated a booklet, which stated " Pacific salmon supports a larger 
number of fishermen, vessels and boats and canneries than any other 
15. Report of Secretary of Commerce, supra , note 12, pp. 51-59. 
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North American fishery." 16 Then, in the 1974 UN Law of the Sea 
Conference plenary session, Canada published a report arguing that 
salmon is the only species of marine fish that can be effectively hatched 
and managed, and therefore, that the salmon-origin state is the only 
agent capable of such responsibility. 17 The report is substantiated on 
the fact that salmon always return to the home stream at the end of 
their life cycle. This predictability permits not only an accurate count 
in fish population, but also allows concentrated management/hatchery 
efforts. The lobbying efforts of these two countries resulted in the Ar-
ticle 66 of the LOS Convention, which gave to the country of origin 
the sole right and the responsibility to manage and conserve its respec-
tive anadromous species of fish. Article 66, in effect, made salmon a 
private good, available to only the country of origin. 
To reinforce the UN proclamation, the Pacific salmon-origin 
countries established another international regime to manage the har-
vests of Pacific salmon. In 1951, the United States, Canada, and Ja-
pan, founded the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(INPFC) in order to better the salmon stock in the Northern Pacific. 18 
Since then, the Commission has gathered annually to discuss the catch 
sizes and fisheries problems, and to exchange information on the fish. 
The Soviet Union, though not a member of INPFC, has also negoti-
ated separate bilateral agreements with the three countries. Through 
INPFC and the bilateral agreements, these four countries have re-
served to themselves the exclusive right to harvest salmon. As of 
1987, the allocation of catches of these four countries are as follows: 
United States, 46.2 percent; Japan, 26.4 percent; U.S.SR, 15.3 percent; 
and Canada, 12.1 percent. 19 The United States is by far the largest 
salmon harvester, and three species of salmon, Pink, Chum and Sock-
eye are the most crucial commerical stocks. 
Neither the INPFC nor Article 66 could deter salmon poaching. 
In both 1987 and 1988, salmon runs in southwest Alaska failed to 
meet the forecasted returns. For example, in 1988, the fishermen 
found only 5 million, out of the expected 42 million Sockeyes. 20 
16. Chasan, Salmon, "Bitter Fruit of Pacific," supra, note 13, p. 8. 
17. Albert W. Koers "Fishery Proposals in the United Nations Seabed Committee: An 
Evaluation," Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 5, No.3, pp. 184-185. 
18. Chasan, Salmon, "Bitter Fruit of Pacific", supra , note 13, p. 20. 
19. Tsai Chien-ta, Kue-yu tsong lei chi sheng-chan kai-kuang (Salmon Variations and 
Harvest Situation) Kaohsiung, Taiwan:Conference on "From International Law of Sea to 
the North Pacific Salmon Problem" August 29, 1989, p. 89. 
20. "Chi-Yang No. 1, High Seas Fishing and the US-Taiwan Fishing Negotiation" 
Chung-hwa yu-ye (China Fisheries Weekly,) June 5, 1989, section 4, p.l. 
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Although some experts have attributed this decline to the unpredict-
ability of the ocean environment and to resulting possible changes in 
the salmon life cycle, most fishermen and fishery specialists blamed the 
decline on the high sea squid fisheries of Japan, South Korea, and the 
ROC. These three fisheries, consisting of approximately 1,400 vessels, 
fished an area equivalent to the size of the continental U.S. in the 
North Pacific. The majority of these vessels operate with driftnets, 
which though effective, are not selective in their catches. Although 
the target catch is flying squid, other catches - such as tuna, dolphin, 
or salmon may also be brought on board. The U.S. fishermen suspect 
that these Asian fisheries, situated just south of the salmon migration 
path, are in position to intercept salmon on their way back to the 
home streams. Confirming the American fishermen's fears, there was 
a sudden salmon glut on the European and Asian market in both 1987 
and 1988.21 Many of the salmon found on these markets were imma-
ture and 'bright' in appearance - meaning that these salmon were 
harvested on the high seas at a point well before they had undergone 
the physical changes22 associated with their returning to the rivers of 
origin to spawn. 23 In addition, the fishermen found of the harvested 
salmon, many with gillnet scars. Because the squid fishery is the only 
driftnet fishery in the area, the U.S. fishermen deduced that the squid 
driftnet fisheries had intercepted North American salmon. The three 
countries suspected of poaching were Japan, South Korea, and the 
ROC. Neither the ROC nor South Korea had the right to harvest 
salmon. Japan, although permitted to catch salmon, had previously 
also agreed to restrict its squid fleet from harvesting salmon. 
Although the U.S. suspects all three countries of poaching North 
American salmon, she found the most evidence against the ROC. The 
ROC poachers are not simple fishermen selling the occasional bycatch 
of salmon. Rather, the ROC violators have carried out meticulous 
strategies of contracting, marketing, and exporting the intercepted 
salmon. According to reliable Japanese sources, there has been around 
110 ROC vessels targeting specifically salmon. In effect, the poachers 
have established well-planned international salmon smuggling- rings. 
As early as 1986, officers of the U.S. National Marine Fishery Service 
(NMFS) seized 595,000 pounds of salmon alleged to have been caught 
21. Pacific Seafood Processors Association,"Illegal High Seas Salmon Interception, Re-
view and Action Plan," Seattle, February 23, 1989, Exhibition 12, p. l. 
22. When salmon reache maturity and return to its river of origin, their appearances 
will turn to a pinkish to red hue, depending on the salmon type. Immature salmon, in 
contrast, are silver in color. 
23. "Illegal High Seas Salmon Interception," supra, note 21, exhibition 1, p. 5. 
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on the high seas by the ROC squid vessels. In June, 1988, NMFS 
agents again uncovered a complex international scheme to import 
ROC-caught salmon (This time 3 million pounds) to Japan via the 
United States. On January 29, 1989, the service concluded a 2 year 
"sting operation" and arrested two individuals who tried to smuggle 
salmon from the ROC. More recently, on July 18, 1989, NMFS and 
the U.S. Coast Guard arrested a ROC national, Patrick Lee, who of-
fered undercover agents 2,500 metric tons of salmon. This more re-
cent arrest involved a dramatic three day, six hundred mile chase 
across the Pacific Ocean as the U.S. Coast Guard cutter "Morgan-
thau" pursued two alleged ROC poaching vessels. These ships, the 
"Ta Fong No 11" and the "Song-Ching No 12", were scheduled to 
deliver the pirated salmon to the 'buyers' on the high seas. 24 
In addition to uncovering these smuggling operations, in 1989 the 
U.S. Coast Guard found much more evidence confirming Taiwanese 
salmon poaching. In February 1989, the U.S. Coast Guards came 
upon an abandoned ROC "ghostship," the "Chi-Sheng." The ship 
contained a cargoload of rotting salmon. In April 1989, the Coast 
Guards detained the ROC vessel, "Chi-Yang No 1", on the basis of 
illegal fishing in the restricted zone and discovered traces of salmon on 
board. Finally, on June 9, 1989, the Coast Guard cutter "Midget" 
found the ROC vessel "Ta Chie No. 3" in the restricted zone. During 
the time the U.S. officials requested the permission from the ROC For-
eign Ministry to board "Ta Chie No. 3," NMFS agents in a Coast 
Guard helicopter, photographed the ROC crew throwing trays of 
salmon into the sea. 2s 
The ROC government claimed that these fishermen were the 
"few" bad apples in the basket. However, the evidence placed her at a 
great disadvantage when negotiating the 1989 fishing agreement in 
which the problem of salmon poaching was one of the major concerns. 
The other separate concern was the use of driftnets on the high seas. 
Although the salmon poaching was due, in part, to the non-selectivity 
of driftnets, the impact of the driftnet operation on the North Pacific 
environment was itself a major issue at the negotiations. 
Driftnetting 
Pelagic driftnetting has been in use since the beginning of the cen-
24. ''The Battle of the Salmon, From Land to Sea," Chung-kuo shih-pao (China 
Times) July 19, 1989, p. 1. 
25. "U.S. Brings Down Hammer on Taiwan 'Squid' Fleet," National Fisherman, (Sep-
tember 1989), pp. 14-15. 
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tury. The UN, in fact, has advocated the use of this technology to 
assist underdeveloped countries in increasing their fishery harvests. 
This traditional accepted form of driftnetting, however, is far smaller 
in scale than its 1980's counterpart in the Pacific Ocean. The unregu-
lated driftnetting in the Pacific Ocean has made the technology envi-
ronmentally destructive. 26 
Driftnets are plastic monofilamented gillnets used in the high sea 
squid fisheries of the North Pacific. The nets are composed of panels 
("tans") of approximately fifty meters long and seven meters deep. 
Floats are attached on top of the net and weights are placed at the 
bottom of the individual tans. The floats and the weights are used to 
adjust the depth and the elasticity of the net (see Appendix 2). The 
mesh size of the net ranges from eighty mmimeters to two hundred 
and twenty millimeters. However, in the squid fisheries, the mesh size 
are uniformly small, ranging from 80 millimeter to 120 miJJimeter. At 
dusk, these nets are released at a right angle to the swimming path of 
the fish. Fish are thus enmeshed or entangled by the nets. After set-
ting, these plastic nets are allowed to drift with the current, hence the 
name, driftnet. During each net-set, around 1000 tans are released 
into the ocean, measuring up to fifty kilometers in length. With close 
to 1,400 driftnet vessels in the North Pacific, around 32,000 kilometers 
of these nets are stretched across the ocean every night. Annually, 
these vessels release almost 1.6 million kilometers of driftnets in the 
North Pacific (see map C)-27 
The non-selectivity of the driftnet has caused it to be nicknamed 
"the wall of death" (see Appendix 3). The net entangles many marine 
animals other than squid, because these plastic nets are almost invisi-
ble to marine animals and because of its small mesh sizes. In the most 
recent YAP Experiment aboard a Japanese fishing vessels belonging to 
the YAP Venture Company, for instance, the crew released 15 kilome-
ters of driftnets for 22 nights. Although the net's target catch was 
Albacore, it also caught and killed 10 sea turtles, one grey whale, 10 
small whales, and 97 dolphins. In addition, Greenpeace estimates that 
the North Pacific driftnet operations killed approximately 800,000 
26. Interview with Tung Ih Hsu, Senior specialist, The Institute of Fishery Biology, 
The National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, August 29, 1989. The Institute, located 
on the National Taiwan University campus, is largely funded by the Council of 
Agriculture. 
27. "High Seas Driftnets", Greenpeace Pacific Campaign, Auckland ,New Zealand, 
1989, p. 3. 
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birds annually.28 
Excessive bycatches of non-target species are not the only prob-
lem. Moreover, the conservationists have argued that this technique is 
extremely wasteful. As the net is retrieved, around forty one percent 
of the catch falls out of the net and around sixteen percent of the re-
trieved catches are considered unmarketable "trash catch" due to net 
scars. Another problem with the net is that discarded nylon nets often 
do not degrade and this will continue to catch marine lifes long after 
the completion of the commercial undertakings. Greenpeace esti-
mates around six hundred miles of these "ghostnets" are lost every 
year in the North Pacific fisheries. 29 
Considering the wastefulness of these driftnets why then do fleets 
continue their driftnet operations? In truth, driftnet fishing is ex-
tremely efficient. Despite the losses, resulting catches compared to 
other fishing techniques are still phenomenal. The Asian high sea 
driftnet fishery flourished mainly in response to four major events in 
the late 1970's: 
1) The increase in fuel prices during the 1970's decreased the 
economic efficiency of using competing fishing techniques, such as 
jigging; 
2) Coastal nations of the world extended exclusive economic 
zones (EEZ) to 200 miles offshore, forcing many distant-water fleets to 
develop new fisheries on the high seas; 
3) Falling tuna prices in the late 1970's stimulated tuna longline 
vessels to explore other fishing opportunities; and 
4) Efforts of the MFCMA and the decreased salmon quota al-
lowed Japan to reduce the number of salmon available to the Japanese 
salmon driftnet fleet. As an ironic result, these driftnet vessels, many 
idled, were forced into the squid fishery. 30 
Driftnet fishing is a logical management decision to reap immedi-
ate profit - yet the technique is so efficient, it is described sometimes 
as "stripmining" the ocean resources. 31 In fact, due to the efficacy of 
the nets, the North Pacific squid fishery June/July catch has declined 
28. "Summary of Scientific Information on High Seas Driftnet Fisheries," Greenpeace, 
Washington D.C., October 1989, p. 3. 
29. "Gill-Netters Churn Up an Outcry,'' Los Angles Times, June 21, 1989, p. 21. 
30. National Marine Fishery Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, "The High Seas Driftnet Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, submitted to the U.S. 
National Section, International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, Anchorage, Alaska, 
September 28, 1989, p. 4. 
31. "Trying to Stop the Slaughter,'' Pacific Islands Monthly, (July 1989), p. 8. 
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fifty percent and the size of the squid has also decreased. 32 Ocean 
resources are renewable, but also exhaustible. A stock can be depleted 
to such a point that regeneration of the population might not be possi-
ble. Modem fishery management is therefore often based on the con-
cept of Optimum Sustainable Yield (OSY). This type of management 
specifies the maximum amount of catch permitted to allow continual 
regeneration of the stock. Driftnet fishing is a fishing technique igno-
rant of the OSY. This method reaps immediate profit without consid-
eration of the possible consequences. 
The linkage between the salmon piracy and the driftnet dispute 
goes beyond the incidental bycatch of salmon. Ironically, it was the 
salmon driftnet fleet that originally generated the squid driftnet fleet. 
In the 1950's, the Japanese high sea salmon fleet first used mile-long 
driftnets to harvest salmon. The record catches prompted the high sea 
squid fleet of Japan to use the same technique in the mid-1970's to 
harvest squid. Following Japan's example, the ROC and South Korea 
also began to use driftnets on the high seas. The mesh size used to 
catch salmon and squids are the same. Consequently, the proximity of 
the squid fishery and salmon migration path has tempted certain fish-
ermen to venture into the restricted areas and to use squid driftnets to 
catch the more valuable salmon. 
The ROC entered the fisheries negotiations in February 1989 
under tremendous pressure. The U.S. negotiators took a firm stand 
and were determined to get a restrictive agreement out of the ROC. 
The ROC could not deny her fishermen's violation of both domestic 
regulation and the 1982 Fishery Agreement. Nevertheless, the sea-
sonal restrictions in the North Pacific fishery has already limited the 
fishery catches, and the ROC was unwilling to permit further restric-
tions in her high sea fishery. In the United States, the pressure for an 
agreement came from all sides and levels. The salmon industry, the 
conservationists, and the regional representatives of Alaska, Oregon, 
and Washington all demanded prompt action from the U.S. negotia-
tors. Entangled in the web of issues, and burdened by incriminating 
evidence, the ROC negotiators faced a formidable Goliath. 
The United States fought fiercely in the negotiations against the 
ROC. The negotiations gained much U.S. media attention and con-
gressional furor. What factors so publicized the salmon/driftnet issue 
in the United States? What factors made the U.S. such a harsh bar-
gainer? In order to understand the U.S. stand throughout the negotia-
32. Summary of Scientific Information on High Seas Driftnet Fisheries. supra, note 26, 
p. 4. 
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tions, it is crucial to analyze the domestic factors in the United States 
which influenced the negotiation process. The following section seeks 
to answer these questions through an analysis of the domestic salmon/ 
driftnet issue in the U.S. political and lobbying arena. 
Section II: The 1989 Fisheries Negotiation: The U.S. Perspective 
In the summer of 1989, the salmon!driftnet dispute captured the 
American public's attention. Driftnet articles graced the front pages 
of national papers, such as the New York Times and The Washington 
Post. 33 Editorials carried trenchant attacks on the use of the driftnet 
technology and its impact on the salmon stock. Television networks, 
meanwhile, broadcasted special driftnet segments on the evening news. 
For several weeks in July, the public and the media clamor over the 
issue elevated this previously obscure problem to a national level. On 
Capitol Hill, the congressional delegation from the Northwestern fish-
ing states and various lobbyist groups successfully made the driftnet 
problem the key issue on the fishery agenda. In the 1989 negotiations 
with the ROC , the United States formed an interagency negotiation 
team, consisting of members from the State Department and the Com-
merce Department's National Marine Fishery Service(NMFS). The 
negotiation team had established positions and goals to achieve. How-
ever, tremendous public and Congressional pressures forced the 
United States to amend its position in the negotiations. To the ROC's 
dismay, these external pressures forced the U.S. negotiators to a rig-
idly uncompromising position. 
How did the driftnet issue stir such public outcry in the United 
States? How did the issue gain so much attention in the Congress? 
This section will analyze the salmon/driftnet dispute and determine 
the most important factor in advancing this issue. In the fisheries dis-
pute with the ROC , four major factors seemed to have the most im-
pact on the U.S. negotiation stand: 1) An attempt to negotiate a tough 
agreement to set a precedent for driftnet talks with other Asian na-
tions, 2) the renewed political climate in favor of conservation 3) the 
concern for U.S. economic interest on both regional and national 
levels 4) the lobbying efforts of U.S. fishing industries and 
conservationists. 
Setting a Precedent 
During six months of fisheries talks with the ROC, the United 
33. "Vandal Fleets of the Pacific," New York Times, September 5, 1989, p.Al8; Gill-
Netter Churns Up an Outcry, supra, note 27, p.2l. 
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States was also consulting with the two other North Pacific dirftnet-
ters, South Korea and Japan. The negotiations with the ROC were 
crucial because the ROC had 165 vessels in the region and was the 
chief culprit in salmon poaching. 34 Japan and South Korea had 500 
and 130 vessels in the area respectively.3s Clearly, the ROC driftnet 
fleet was only part of the problem in the North Pacific. In this situa-
tion, for the United States to construct an effective management 
scheme in the North Pacific, she needed to negotiate successfully with 
all three nations. 
Although the ROC was the key salmon poacher in the North Pa-
cific, the real fishing force in the area was Japan. Japan had the largest 
fleet in the area, and was the most efficient harvester in the squid fish-
ery. To further supplement its harvest, the Japanese fishing industry 
contracted many of the ROC vessels to operate in the area, to the 
extent that some of the ROC squid vessels had Japanese captains and 
crew.36 More importantly, reliable information from Japan had con-
firmed that several Japanese fishing companies had contracted ROC 
vessels to harvest salmon illegally, to compensate for the decreased 
Japanese salmon quota set by the International North Pacific Fisheries 
Commission(INPFC). These vessels, estimated up to 114, harvested 
specifically for salmon in the North Pacific.37 These facts threw the 
poaching problem in a different light. ROC salmon poachers served 
essentially as a Japanese ploy to get around the salmon quota. One 
can even claim that the Japanese were responsible for these ROC ves-
sels poaching in the North Pacific. Thus, a tough agreement over the 
driftnet/salmon problem with Japan must compliment a tough agree-
ment with the ROC . 
The South Korean operation in the squid fishery also exceeded 
that of the ROC. Korean vessels harvested on the average three times 
as much squid as the ROC fleet. 38 Furthermore, the South Korean 
fleet, unlike the ROC or the Japanese fleet, had no seasonal fishing 
boundaries in the North Pacific. 39 The 1989 North Pacific Fisheries 
Negotiations with South Korea began therefore on an empty slate. 
Negotiating without precedents, it was difficult for the United States 
34. Report of Secretary of Commerce, supra , note 12, p. 12. 
35. Report of Secretary of Commerce, supra , note 12, pp. 10-11. 
36. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Magnuson 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 Reauth.-Part II, lOlst Congress, 1st 
session, 1989, p. 109. 
37. Ibid., p. 114. 
38. National Marine Fisheries Service, The High Seas Driftnet, supra, note 28, p. 14. 
39. National Marine Fisheries Service, The High Seas Driftnet, supra, note 28, p. 114. 
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to establish a tough, restrictive agreement with South Korea immedi-
ately. Nonetheless, it was crucial for the United States to negotiate 
successfully with the Koreans to protect her fishery interests in the 
North Pacific. Moreover, such an agreement must also be comparable 
to the agreement signed with the ROC and Japan to construct a com-
prehensive strategy for the North Pacific. 
The negotiations with the ROC were intrinsically linked to the 
fisheries talks with both Japan and South Korea. The United States 
was well aware of the impact of one agreement on another country's 
stand in the negotiations. She understood that these three countries 
had common interest in maintaining its driftnet operations and would 
discuss and possibly strategize together throughout their individual 
negotiation processes. In lieu of these circumstances, the ROC , in 
many ways, was the easiest of the three driftnetters with whom to ne-
gotiate. First, the United States had much direct evidence against 
ROC salmon poaching. Second, the ROC was diplomatically and eco-
nomically dependent on the United States. The ROC was extremely 
cautious with her relations with the United States, and taking full ad-
vantage of the ROC's subordinate position, the United States negoti-
ated hard against the ROC . 
It was in the American interest to obtain tough agreements early 
on, to set precedents for the later negotiations. With this in mind, the 
United States used the AIT-CCNAA agreement as a precedent for a 
Korean agreement. She also wanted a tough agreement with the ROC 
as a step to curb Japanese schemes to exploit the quota situation. Af-
ter the ROC agreed to the accord in August, an American official, in 
response to Korea's reluctance to come to an agreement, said "Any 
Korean agreement would have to be at least as tough as that signed by 
the ROC. Otherwise, efforts to get a stronger agreement from Japan 
next year would be undermined. "40 This official then added " The 
whole effort to monitor driftnets could go down the tubes if we don't 
get tough with the Koreans."41 This statement clearly reflected a 
strategy to progressively regulate and restrict the squid fleet operations 
in the North Pacific. The 1989 negotiations appeared to be the first 
stage toward a complete ban on driftnetting in the area. The negotia-
tions with the ROC were to establish an accord to begin the process 
for such a ban. 
40. Clyde Farnsworth, "Taiwan to Let U.S. Monitor Drift-Net Fishing Practices," The 
New York Times, August 26, 1989, p. Dl. 
41. Ibid., p. Dl. 
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Environmental Concerns 
Many experts agreed that the 90's will be the Earth decade and 
that environmental concerns have become a massive world-wide 
force. 42 According to Futurist Edith Weiner of the Manhattan man-
agement consulting firm Weiner Edrich Brown," Environmentalism 
will be the next major political idea, just as conservatism and liber-
alism have been in the past."43 These experts, so far, appear to be 
right. The New York Times/CBS News poll regularly asked the pub-
lic "If protecting the environment is so important that requirements 
and standards cannot be too high, and continuing environmental im-
provements must be made regardless of cost." In September 1981, of 
those surveyed, 45 percent agreed and 42 percent disagreed. In June 
1989, 79 percent agreed and only 18 percent disagreed.44 For the first 
time, liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans, pro-
fessed concern for the environment in roughly equal numbers. After 
almost a decade of Reagan indifference toward conservation, the Bush 
administration, in response to this societal trend, came into the office 
with promises of a cleaner and healthier environment. George Bush, 
dubbed the "environmental president."45 has made the environment a 
priority on his agenda and has nurtured the political climate for con-
servation. In addition, the 1980's marked the beginning of a series of 
global or cross-border environmental threats ranging from large-
scaled global warming to cross-border acid rain problems. 46 On the 
international level, the United States was especially concerned with 
the environmental hazards which she herself did not create, yet none-
theless, experienced. The driftnet issue resembled this type of problem 
in that Americans, though not high sea driftnetters, has to bear the 
consequence of driftnetting. By the late 1980's, environmental protec-
tion had become a unavoidable issue for the U.S. Congress. By the 
end of the 80's, therefore, conservation has already gained much polit-
ical momentum. The driftnet issue, from this point of view, was a 
perfect environmental issue both domestically and internationally. On 
the domestic level, the nets were depleting the salmon stock, an Amer-
ican private good. On the global level, the nets were dwindling the 
high sea marine resources, a public good. 
42. David, Kirkpatrick,"Environmentalism: The New Crusade," Fortune, Vol. 121, 
February 12, 1990, p. 44. 
43. Ibid., p. 44. 
44. Ibid., p. 46. 
45. Cable News Network, "Headline News," Atlanta, Georgia, January 9, 1990. 
46. ''The Whole Earth Agenda," US News & World Reports, Vol. 107, (December 25 
1989/January 1, 1990), p. 50. 
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Driftnet fishing has he¢n in progress in the Northern Pacific since 
the late 1970's. However, it took almost a decade of lobbying to at-
tract effective attention to the issue. The advent of the age of conser-
vation clearly helped to win support for the issue. Driftnet fishing 
went against all the principles of conservation. It was a fishing tech-
nology concerned only with the short-term profit and ignorant of pos-
sible environmental damage. 47 The drought of 1988, the smog in 
major U.S. cities, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill have sensitized public 
awareness to environmental protection in the late 1980's. President 
Bush promised to lead America toward greater" environmental eth-
ics."48 The Congress, appealing to both constituents and real environ-
mental hazards, also began legislating environmental bills such as the 
Clean Air Act. American politicians have recognized that wanton pil-
lage of America's natural resources can no longer be permitted. 
Driftnet fishing, in "stripmining" the ocean and depleting the salmon 
stocks, became easily a focus of attack in the Congress. In fact, to 
highlight the severity of the problem, Greenpeace, the global conserva-
tion group, stated before the U.S. House of Representatives subcom-
mittee on Human Rights and International Organization, that the 
technology was "posing hazards to the marine environment that are 
on par with other major global environmental concerns, such as . . . 
global warming, ozone layer destruction and deforestation."49 The en-
vironment had become a major concern to the American public. The 
increased emphasis the American public placed on the quality of the 
environment helped to advance the driftnet issue. 
The U.S. Congress rallied against driftnetting aggressively. The 
combination of the domestic conservation enthusiasm and interna-
tional environmental demands made the driftnet issue an appropriate 
issue to tackle. First, the issue conformed to the "conservation ethics" 
popular with the American public at the time. Second, foreign fisher-
men were not constituents. In essence, then, the congressional repre-
sentatives were faced with a classic "us vs. them" situation with 
virtually unanimity of support. 50 The scope of congressional lobbying 
47. "High Sea Driftnets," Greenpeace Pacific Campaign, Washington, D.C., supra, 
note 28, p. 2. 
48. George Bush, "Promises to Keep," Sierra, Vol. 73, (November/December 1988), p. 
62. 
49. Gerald Leape, Testimony on Behalf of the Entanglement Network Coalition Regard-
ing an Oversight Hearing on Drift Gil/nets before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and 
International Organizations, Greenpeace, U.S.A., Washington, D.C., September 28, 1989, 
p. 1. 
50. Pacific Seafood Processors Association, "Illegal High Seas Salmon Interception," 
supra, note 21, p. 10. 
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went beyond the elimination of salmon poaching. In addition to de-
manding restrictive agreements on the Asian driftnetters, many repre-
sentatives desired a complete ban on the technology. Representative 
Peter A. DeFazio (Oregon) introduced a bill to prohibit any import of 
fish caught by driftnets. 51 Representative Jolene Unsoeld (Washing-
ton), with thirty five Congressional sponsors, also introduced "The 
Marine Resource Protection and Driftnet Use Cessation Act of 1989" 
to mandate a ban on driftnet fishing by 1992.52 In addition, Senator 
Frank Murkowski (Alaska), Senator Ted Stevens (Alaska), Represen-
tative Don Young (Alaska) and Representative John Miller (Washing-
ton) were all actively involved in efforts to ban driftnetting. The 
environmental hazards of driftnetting prompted a conservation-con-
scious Congress to act vigorously against the technology and its users. 
The rise of the environmental movement in the United States forced 
the U.S. negotiators to take a unyielding stand against the ROC. 
Economics-Federal Fisheries Management 
The salmon industry in the United States "nurses" thousands of 
salmon yearly in its hatcheries. As part of the federal Magnuson Fish-
ery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (MFCMA), the gov-
ernment, both state and federal, initiated numerous programs to 
enhance salmon harvests. 53 The ROC fishing vessels interception of 
these salmon had frustrated the U.S. efforts to increase her salmon 
stock and brought congressional attention to the situation. Evidence 
of salmon poaching by the driftnet fleets of the North Pacific per-
suaded the Congress in 1987 to pass the the Driftnet Impact, Monitor-
ing, Assessment and Control Act (the Driftnet Act). 54 The act 
identified driftnetting as the key culprit in depleting U.S. marine re-
sources. Through the act, the Congress, sought to preserve and en-
hance America's marine resources, in particular, the salmon stock. 
The 1987 Driftnet act, passed under extreme pressure from the 
fishery lobby and the environmentalists, was designed to better under-
stand the technology and regulate its use. 55 The act called for negoti-
ations with the driftnet nations to find a cooperative solution to the 
51. Timothy Egan, "New Evidence of Ecological Damage Brings a Call to Ban Drift-
Net Fishing," New York Times, November 15, 1989, p. Al3. 
52. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Reauth. Part II, 
supra, note 34, p. 6. 
53. Edward Wolf, "U.S. Responsibilities," supra, note 10, pp. 56-57. 
54. Report of Secretary of Commerce, supra, note 13, pp. 1-3. 
55. Clyde Farnsworth, "Taiwan to Let U.S. Monitor Drift-Net Fishing Practices," 
New York Times, August 26, 1989, p. 33. 
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issue. Specifically, the act mandated for negotiations of 1) an adequate 
monitoring and assessment agreement for the deployment of scientific 
observers on squid driftnet vessels, and 2) an adequate enforcement 
agreement with particular emphasis on the control of fishing in areas 
and seasons where significant number of U.S. marine resources, partic-
ularly salmon, may be taken. The Commerce Secretary, with the 
assistance of the Secretary of State, was responsible for negotiating 
these agreements by the summer of 1989. If an agreement can not be 
negotiated, the president of the United States shall retaliate with the 
Fishermen's Protection Act, which placed an embargo on a nation's 
fishery imports to the United States. The 1989 AIT-CCNAA Fisher-
ies Negotiations was thus carried out pursuant to the Driftnet Act. 
The Driftnet Act established the negotiation guidelines, and placed 
legal and time pressures on the U.S. negotiators to obtain a favorable 
agreement from the ROC . 
The U.S. 200-mile coastal zone is the largest in the world, 
amounting to 2,222 square kilometers. 56 The marine resources in 
these waters, based on Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) re-
search, contained around 15-20 percent of the global fisheries re-
sources. 57 The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
of 1976 (MFCMA) was designed to preserve U.S. marine resources 
for U.S. fishermen. Through MFCMA, the U.S. government assumed 
complete jurisdiction in managing the marine resources within her 
200-mile EEZ and the anadromous species spawned from her rivers. 
In 1989, the MFCMA expired, and hearings were held in Boston, 
Washington D.C., Seattle, and Anchorage before the House Subcom-
mittee on Fishery and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment to 
reauthorize the act with the needed changes. In Seattle and 
Anchorage the focus of the hearings was placed particularly on 
driftnetting, and of all the Asian driftnetters, the ROC was singled out 
as the "exemplary poacher." At the hearing, Ambassador Edward 
Wolf, deputy director of the State Department's Bureau of Ocean and 
International Environment and Scientific Affairs, stated to the sub-
committee that the act has been extremely successful. Direct alloca-
tion of catch to foreign fishing fleets had fallen from 1980's total of 
2,176,789 (mt) down to 51,577 (mt) in 1989. The American commer-
cial and recreational fishing industries had prospered through the act. 
56. Alexander Lewis & Robert Hodgson, "The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone 
on the Law of the Seas", San Diego Law Review, (December 1975), pp. 574-575 et seq. 
57. Tsai Chien-ta, Mei-kuo yu-ye fa jan cheng-tse chi kuan-li ts'uo- shi yen-chiou hsin-
de pao-kao, (United States Fishery Policy Development and Management Plan, Summary 
Report), Taipei, Taiwan: Council of Agriculture, 1986, p. 2. 
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The United States has finally gained complete control over her EEZ 
resources. In the same statement, however, Ambassador Wolf also 
pointed to salmon poaching in the North Pacific. He remarked that 
the ROC vessels, in particular, have been sighted many times by the 
Coast Guard, operating in the restricted zones. Wolf stressed the fact 
that in order for MFCMA to be completely successful, the United 
States and the driftnettters must come to terms on the issue of high sea 
salmon interception. To resolve the problem, he suggested extensive 
international cooperation to advance U.S. fishery interests 58 
The management of the U.S. anadromous species was a crucial 
aspect of the MFCMA. The U.S. government had used millions of 
dollars implementing many programs to increase the salmon stock. 
These programs produced numerous salmon hatcheries on land and 
assisted the juvenile salmon in their journeys to the ocean. The United 
States had essentially "farmed" her salmon runs through meticulous 
management strategies. The state of Oregon, for example, persuaded 
the Bonneville Power Co., who had constructed a dam on the Colum-
bia river, to spend more than $30 million annually to permit salmon 
migration to and from the ocean. 59 The state, in an effort to manag-
ing the salmon stock, lost an additional $40 million annually in power 
revenue. 60 This kind of sacrifice reflected the importance of the 
salmon industry to the state. With high sea salmon poaching, the 
money spent on this kind of management was lost. With salmon 
poaching, the MFCMA could not effectively manage the anadromous 
species of U.S.-origin. The federal government, consequently, took 
quick actions to curb the driftnet poaching on the high seas. 
During the subcommittee hearings on MFCMA, the emotions of 
the Northwest congressional representatives ran high. Throughout 
the hearings, these representatives stressed angrily their frustration 
with salmon poaching on the high seas. Furthermore, while the hear-
ing was in progress in Boston, the U.S. Coast Guard was in hot pursuit 
of a ROC squid vessel suspected of salmon poaching. The attention 
was thus focused on the ROC. 61 While the State Department, repre-
58. Edward Wolf, "U.S. Responsibilities", supra , note 10, pp. 56-58. 
59. Teresa Carp, "Fishermen Fight Doomsday Device," Oregon Business, (August 
1989), p. 52. 
60. Kai Lee, "Columbia River Basin," Environment, Vol 31, No. 6, (July/August 
1989), p. 11. 
61. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environ-
ment on H.R. 2061, 101st Congress, 1st session, 1989, p. 6. 
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sented by Ambassador Edward Wolf, advocated cooperation and cau-
tion, the Congress persons demanded immediate and tough actions. 
Representative John Miller (Washington) demanded immediate 
boarding of the suspected ROC vessel on the high seas. Representa-
tive Don Young (Alaska) suggested trade sanctions and exclaimed, 
"Until you take very strong action, Taiwan is going to laugh at you. 
I've been around them long enough to know that. " 62 Representative 
Jolene Unsold (Washington) wanted to amend the MFCMA to in-
clude the assumption that any salmon found on a squid driftnet vessel 
is a U.S. salmon. The Coast Guard and the State Department came 
under heavy criticism for their adherence to international law, which 
prohibited forced boarding on the high seas. The department was also 
criticized for not using economic sanctions against the ROC for her 
fishermen's violation in poaching salmon. 63 The incident was 
presented in a "crisis" context and the ROC dubbed a "pirate." 
North American salmon spawned in United States belonged to the 
United States. The ROC fishing vessels' interception of salmon vio-
lated not only the LOS Convention, but also undermined years of U.S. 
domestic efforts, through the MFMCA, to nurture her salmon stocks. 
Economics-Industry Analysis 
From the national standpoint, the salmon industry is really the 
jewel of the U.S. fishing industry. The United States harvested 562 
thousand pounds of salmon in 1987, which had an ex-vessel value of 
$596 million. In term of poundage, this was ten percent of the overall 
U.S. fish catch in 1987. In term of value, however, this was a substan-
tial thirty-seven percent of the 1987 overall U.S. fish ex-vessel value. 
Of all the marine species harvested by the United States, salmon had 
the highest value, exceeding even the shrimp industry in 1987, which 
had traditionally been the most valuable. The salmon industry has 
had a pivotal position in the U.S. fishery economy. In addition, be-
cause salmon harvests in the United States are concentrated only in 
the Northwest states, the poaching problem in the North Pacific be-
came even more urgent. 64 
On the regional level, the Northwest is truly America's fishery. 
The region produced five billion pounds of edible fish in 1988, which 
constituted fifty percent of the overall fishery harvests in the United 
62. Ibid., p. 23. 
63. Ibid., p. 22. 
64. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oflice,l988, pp. 664-669. 
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States(see Graph 1).65 Alaska fishermen alone harvested 60 percent of 
the annual U.S. EEZ catch, amounting to $3.5 billion (see Graph 2).66 
Nationally, Alaska is ranked first in fishery produce value. The state 
of Washington, on the other hand, is ranked number seven in both 
catch poundage and value. 67 Within the region's fishing industries, the 
salmon industry formed the backbone of the fishery harvests. It was 
the bread and butter for many constituents of the state of Alaska, 
Washington, and Oregon. 
In Alaska, the commercial fishing industry has replaced the oil 
and gas industry as the most valuable private industry. With 60 per-
cent of her residents fishermen, the state can rightly be called the fish-
ing state. While oil and gas reserves may dwindle, fishery resources 
are renewable. Alaska's fishing industry can thus only grow in impor-
tance. The salmon industry is by far the most important fishery in 
Alaska. Alaska salmon landing in 1985, for example, was sixteen 
times that of the salmon landings in Washington state (see Graph 3). 
The fishery industry contributed $745 million to the state of Alaska in 
1988, which amounted to 48.2 percent of the overall ex-vessel value 
for the state in that year (see Appendices 4 & 5). High sea salmon 
interception appeared to have had the most impact on the Pink and 
Chum returns in the Southeast region of the state. The state has estab-
lished special governor's task force and special bureaus to study and 
combat the problem. On Capitol Hill, state representatives Don 
Young, Frank Murkowskis and Ted Stevens have all lobbied actively 
for the salmon industry 68 
The state of Washington, harvesting up to sixty percent of the 
nation's food fish, is also very much dependent on her fishery income 
(see Appendices 6 & 7). Washington has more than 36,000 fishermen 
and the combined fisheries contribution to the state in 1988 amounted 
to more than $3 billion. 69 Many major seafood companies have head-
quarters in Seattle and operate also out of the state in Alaska or Ore-
gon. In Washington, the salmon catch in 1988 amounted to $240 
million and accounted for forty two percent of the overall state fish 
catch value. The salmon landing in Washington, though less than 
65. Ibid., p. 45. 
66. Ibid., p. 173. 
67. Statistical Abstract of the United States, supra , note 64, p. 664. 
68. Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Division of Commercial Fisheries, A Sym-
posium on the Value of Commercial Fisheries to Alaska, presented at the 15th Annual Meet-
ing of the American Fisheries Society, Juneau, Alaska, November 14-17, 1988, pp. 17-23. 
69. Reauthorization of the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act , 
supra, note 61, p. 3. 
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Alaska, is still nine times that of the combined salmon landings in 
Oregon and California(see Graph 3). The state was eager to maintain 
this industry. In response to salmon poaching, the seafood processors, 
the environmentalists, and the fishermen's groups have joined their 
voices, condemning driftnetting. The state's congressional representa-
tives such as John Miller and Jolene Unsoeld were also very aggressive 
in promoting the salmon industry's causes on Capitol Hill. 
The salmon industry is also crucial to the state of Oregon. 
Although relatively speaking, the industry is much smaller in Oregon 
than in either Alaska or Washington, it nonetheless provides the state 
with substantial revenue. According to the Oregon Department of 
Fish and Wildlife (ODFW), the landed value of salmon in the state 
was $36 million in 1988. The recreational salmon income was $11 
million and the total personal income effect of both commercial and 
recreational salmon industry was $66 million. 70 At the turn of the 
century, Oregon's Columbia River was famous for its rich salmon 
runs. Due to overfishing, however, the run has been depleted by more 
than ninety percent. 71 The high value of salmon had prompted the 
state to try to rebuild these runs through more extensive management. 
Salmon poaching interfered with the efforts to restock the salmon 
runs. The state thus also lobbied to curb the poaching problems. 
The salmon industry is a key sector of the U.S. fishing industry 
and a major component of the Northwest economy. The U.S. govern-
ment has ploughed millions of dollars and spent years of research in 
stocking the salmon population. The ROC, in pirating salmon on the 
high seas, not only deprived the United States of her immediate prof-
its, but also decreased the future salmon stock by intercepting the fish 
before they could spawn. Moreover, the ROC "piracy" has been al-
leged to disrupt years of American data-gathering and research on the 
salmon habitat. In response, the United States negotiated hard to 
avert the "salmon crisis." 
The Anti-Driftnet Lobby 
Lobbying was a major force throughout the entire negotiation 
process. The lobbyists, working closely with Congressional representa-
tives, maintained the focus and the intensity of the issue at hand. Lob-
bying is, of course, nothing new in American politics. The driftnet/ 
salmon dispute, however, has spurred a different kind of lobbying. 
The dispute created a lobbying alliance with tremendous resources and 
70. Teresa, Carp, "Fishermen Fight Doomsday Device;" supra , note 59 pp. 52-53. 
71. K.ai Lee, "Columbia River Basin," supra , note 60, p. 8. 
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varying dimensions. This anti-driftnet lobby consisted basically of the 
global conservation group Greenpeace, commercial seafood proces-
sors, the Pacific Seafood Processors Association (PSP A), and two fish-
erman's group, Bering Sea Fishermen's Association and South East 
Alaska Coalition Opposed to Piracy of Salmon (SEACOPS). These 
forces lobbied on all levels from the UN General Assembly to the fish-
ing town of Ketchikan. The alliance summoned each group's 
strengths and supplemented each other's weaknesses. It forwarded the 
driftnet issue to both the public and to Capitol Hill. Both, in turn, 
translated these concerns into political pressure on the U.S. negotia-
tors from the State and Commerce Departments. 
Northwest lobbying activities constituted the backbone of the 
anti-driftnet lobby. Regional lobbying groups consisted of both the 
fishermen and fishery businesses. The lobbying activities were carried 
out on the grass-roots level in the states and in Washington D.C. In 
Seattle, one of the most active and effective salmon lobbies was the 
PSPA. The group, with offices in Seattle, Juneau, and Washington, 
consisted of various seafood processing firms around the Northwest 
region. PSPA, with 75 years of history, was the oldest fish lobby in 
the Northwest72 and had the financial resources and the expertise to 
perform calculated lobbying activities on both the state and national 
level. 
The PSP A lobby took two lobbying approaches. On one level it 
tried to persuade the politicians to pass tougher measures against 
driftnetters. On another level, it worked closely with the U.S. govern-
ment in collecting data on the driftnet technology and in prosecuting 
salmon poachers. PSP A's 200-page action plan against Salmon piracy 
thoroughly documented the history of salmon piracy, the legal actions 
against piracy and the group's strategy in combating the piracy. 73 
PSP A's immediate goals in its lobbying were to broaden the support 
for its cause and to maintain the level of outrage among the public. It 
was disappointed with the State Department's soft-line, cautious ap-
proach to the driftnet nations and demanded prompt measures against 
the nations of the ROC , Japan, and South Korea. To garner broader 
support, PSP A suggested to its member companies an alliance with 
the conservationists. It also suggested the hiring of a public relations 
firm to transmit to the public first- hand documentation on illegal fish-
ing. The lobbying group planned to use the 'shock value' of the photo-
72. Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Reauth.-Part II, 
supra , note 36, p. 197. 
73. Pacific Seafood Processors Association, "Illegal High Sea Salmon Interception," 
supra , note 21, p. 1 et seq. 
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graphs and 'sting operations' targeted toward the poachers to summon 
public sympathy and support. On the legislative level, PSP A main-
tained direct and constant contact with politicians such as Governor 
Cowper of Alaska and Representative John Miller of Washington. 
The alliance of PSP A and the state government worked extremely well 
on the driftnet issue. The extensive correspondences between the or-
ganization and various political leaders, such as Secretary of State 
George Schultz reflected its scope of influence in Washington. 74 
The efforts of PSPA extended from the state to the nation's capi-
tal. The outrage of the fishermen, on the other hand, supplemented 
such efforts on the grass-roots level. In Ketchikan, Alaska, the fisher-
men and fishery biologists formed the SEACOPS. Although the 
group was only formed in 1988 and had only a membership of 2000, it 
provided first-hand information on driftnet poaching. 75 The grass-
roots group focused its attention solely on salmon piracy and occupied 
the front-line of this international dispute. Unlike PSPA, which for-
mulated calculated action plans, SEACOPS lobbied on emotions. The 
poaching problem affected the fishermen· directly and severely. 
SEACOPS rejected the "path of cooperation" as a solution to the 
poaching problem. 76 Instead, it supported trade sanctions, increased 
Coast Guard patrols and the elimination of driftnet fishing. The views 
of SEACOPS has garnered support from more powerful fishermen 
groups, such as the Bering Sea Fishermen's Association, the Southeast 
Alaska Seiner's Association, and the United Fishermen of Alaska. 
The Bering Sea Fishermen's Association (BSF A) long involved 
with the driftnet problem in the Bristol Bay, for example, has been a 
powerful ally for SEACOPS. A traditionally powerful fishermen's 
lobby, the group has detailed documentation on past Japanese driftnet 
violations and has lobbied actively in the U.S. Congress. SEACOPS 
and BSF A worked together on the poaching problem involving the 
three Asian nations. Representing the interest of the local fishermen, 
BSF A was also permitted to express its view in the negotiation's ple-
nary sessions. 77 This grass-roots coalition, having direct access to the 
negotiations also exerted additional pressure on the U.S. negotiators. 
74. Pacific Seafood Processors Association, "Illegal High Sea Salmon Interception," 
supra , note 21, pp. 180-198. 
75. Mark Tennant, SEACOPS Newsletter, Ketchikan, Alaska, 1989, p. l. 
76. Mark Tennant, "Trade War Proposed to Save Steelhead and Salmon," Salmon, 
Trout, Stee/header, (September 1989), p. 13. 
77. Telephone conversation with Mr. George Hurrfurth, U.S. Department of State, 
Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, Washington, D.C., 
October 23, 1989. 
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In the PSP A action plan, one of the strategies was to unite with 
the environmentalists to gain a broader base of support. The strategy 
was wise. In the anti- driftnet alliance, one of the most powerful lobby-
ing forces was the conservation group, Greenpeace. Greenpeace is an 
international conservation group with four million members world-
wide. It has offices in twenty one nations and is active in issues ranging 
from anti- nuclear testings to "Save the Whales!' For the past six 
years, Greenpeace has appealed for international action to mitigate the 
environmental hazards of driftnet technology.78 Greenpeace has 
gained a lot of media coverage for its rather unorthodox means of 
protesting. For instance, it has for years interfered with the Japanese 
whaling operation by placing its speedcrafts between the harpoon and 
the whale. In its effort to ban driftnet fishing, Greenpeace mustered its 
resources around the Pacific rim and carried out extensive lobbying in 
the United States. Within the overall anti-driftnet lobby, Greenpeace 
was responsible for fighting the legal battles and lobbied on the inter-
national front. 
Greenpeace had been rather successful in the past on the driftnet 
issue. It succeeded in persuading the United States to eject the Japa-
nese salmon driftnet fleet from the U.S. EEZ. It also forced the Cana-
dian government to abandon its deep sea driftnet research fishery. In 
this round of the fight, however, the group sought for a complete ban 
on the technology. In the United States, Greenpeace has 1.25 million 
members , 350,000 in the state of Washington alone. In addition, 
Greenpeace U.S.A. was a leader among other conservation groups in 
the United States. In October 1989, for example, Greenpeace 
presented to a House hearing a proposal to ban driftnet fishing on be-
half of the Entanglement Network Coalition, a conservation alliance 
of 16 environmental groups, totaling 11 million members. 79 With its 
influence in the United States, Greenpeace carried out the its driftnet 
campaign on both the legislative and the public fronts. To bring pub-
lic awareness to the problem, Greenpeace conducted a national cam-
paign with mailings and demonstrations. It also began market 
research to identify and boycott driftnet-caught fish. On the legislative 
side, Greenpeace, presented various proposals at the MFCMA hearing 
and at the 1988 International North Pacific Fisheries Convention 
meeting in Tokyo. The Greenpeace documentation at these hearings 
were thorough and the proposals thoughtful. Despite the group's radi-
78. Sebia Hawkins, "Letter to the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations," 
Greenpeace, Washington, D.C., Fall, 1989. 
79. Gerald Leap, "Testimony on Behalf of the Entanglement Network Coalition,". 
supra , note 49, p. 1. 
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cal reputation, Greenpeace's efforts in the U.S. legislature on the issue 
portrayed it as an intelligent group with reasonable suggestions. In 
the United States, the group succeeded in elevating the issue to the 
national level and with a broad base of support influenced the congres-
sional attitude on the matter. 80 
On the international level, Greenpeace was also active. While, 
the group's New Zealand office assisted in the effort to ban driftnet 
fishing in the South Pacific, it also successfully persuaded the UN 
General Assembly to mandate a ban on the technology worldwide. 
Greenpeace representatives also traveled to both the ROC on Taiwan 
and Japan to convey their views to the respective govemments.81 The 
reputation of Greenpeace has indeed raised fishery concerns in the 
ROC and Japan. To these countries, Greenpeace is a unpredictable 
player, capable of real mischief. Greenpeace New Zealand, in fact, has 
already threatened to cut the nets in the South Pacific, where the ROC 
has 130 vessels fishing for albacore. 82 This decision undoubtedly 
brought further international attention on the technology and placed 
further pressure on the ROC to stop. 
Facing this formidable alliance, the ROC found one fishery lobby 
on her side, the American Tunaboat Association. 83 The United States 
has a great demand for tuna and imports forty four percent of its tuna 
from abroad. The ROC is the second largest supplier of tuna to the 
United States. In 1985, she exported around $30 million worth of 
tuna from the ROC, equivalent to 14.3 percent of the overall tuna 
import.84 The 1987 Driftnet Law stated that if through negotiations, 
an agreement is not forth-coming, the president may retaliate with an 
embargo on that country's fishery exports. The tuna industry did not 
want to loose one of its main oversea suppliers. It, therefore, lobbied 
for a more favorable agreement with the ROC . The impact of the tuna 
lobby, however, may never be clear as the ROC yielded to all the U.S. 
demands in the agreement. 
80. "High Sea Driftnets, " Greenpeace Pacific Campaign, Washington, D.C., Fall, 
1989, p. 7. 
81. Interview with Mike Hagler, Ocean Ecology Campaigner, Greenpeace New Zea-
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82. Ibid. 
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Impact of the Lobby on the U.S. Negotiators 
The anti-driftnet lobby was extremely effective. Throughout the 
negotiations, these lobbyists in conjunction with congressional repre-
sentatives forced a tough U.S. stand against the ROC. The State De-
partment and the Commerce Department wanted an agreement with 
the ROC that would resolve the salmon poaching problem and restrict 
the driftnet operations. Yet, the departments preferred an agreement 
based on the "path of cooperation. " 85 The ROC was a friendly ally of 
the United States, and the negotiators did not want to jeopardize the 
relationship. Ambassador Edward Wolf of the State Department, for 
instance, constantly stressed cooperation and caution in dealing with 
the salmon poaching problem. 86 
On May 2, 1989, the United States chief negotiator, Richard 
Smith negotiated a fishery draft with Japan. Although the draft was 
the best monitoring agreement the United States has ever had with 
Japan, the fishing lobby found the agreement completely unacceptable. 
Opponents of the agreement argued that "path of cooperation" was 
unrealistic and demanded a more restrictive agreement. 87 The Secre-
tary of Commerce consequently rejected the May 2 agreement, and the 
subsequent June 3rd agreement with Japan was much more restrictive. 
Because the U.S. negotiation strategy was to coordinate similar agree-
ments with all three Asian driftnetters, a tough Japanese agreement 
therefore resulted also in a tough agreement with the ROC. The lob-
byists dictated the U.S. approach to the negotiations. It clearly influ-
enced the outcome of the negotiations. 
In the 1989 negotiations with the ROC on Taiwan, the congres-
sional representatives criticized the U.S. negotiators for being placid 
and interfered in the process whenever they could. In July, Senator 
F. Murkowski (Alaska) disrupted the annual weapon purchase meet-
ing between The ROC's Military Chief of Staff, General Hao Po-tsuen 
and the Senate Armed Services Committee Chair, Sam Nunn. Senator 
Murkowski then released a press brief threatening to ban arm sales to 
the ROC , if the ROC refused to sign the fishery agreement. 88 This 
annual meeting was always kept rather confidential to avoid possible 
objections from the People's Republic of China. Senator Murkowski's 
intrusion infuriated the State Department. The American Institute in 
85. Mark Tennant, ''Trade War Proposed to Save Steelhead and Salmon," Salmon, 
Trout, Stee/header, (August-September, 1989), p. 12. 
86. Edward Wolf, "U.S. Responsibilities," supra , note 10, p. 58. 
87. Ibid, p. 12. 
88. American Institute in Taiwan, Media Summary, "News of General Hau's U.S. 
Visit Leaked; Washington Angry," July 28, 1989, p. 1. 
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Taiwan (AIT) was, in fact, immediately ordered to avoid any contact 
with the senator or his office. 89 Murkowski's actions, however, struck 
home. The ROC media headlined the incident and the ROC govern-
ment considered the threat seriously. The congressional representa-
tives were willing to go to considerable lengths to reach their 
objectives. In the driftnet negotiations, the United States negotiators 
had to come to terms with all kinds of external pressure, even extreme 
ones such as Senator Murkowski's stunt. 
Looking at the various factors, the lobbying alliance appears to 
have been the most powerful factor in the U.S. negotiating position. 
With each group taking on separate responsibilities, the concentrated 
lobbying really dictated the U.S. position on driftnet fishing. While 
the State Department and the Commerce Department preferred a co-
operative scheme to resolve the driftnet/salmon dispute, the lobbying 
forces demanded strong and immediate sanctions or regulations to de-
ter the violators. The caution of the interagency negotiators con-
trasted sharply with the aggressive lobbying demands. In the overall 
negotiation process, the United States maintained an extremely ada-
mant position. Although both environmental and economic concerns 
were main focuses, the lobbying alone put the negotiators on the spot. 
The lobbying directly, and indirectly through the Congress pressured 
the American negotiators to detour away from more cooperative 
agreements with the ROC. Although the salmon industry and the 
conservationists were still not completely satisfied with the agreement, 
the agreement was a costly defeat for the ROC government and her 
squid driftnet fishery in the North Pacific. 
Under congressional pressure, the United States negotiators had 
no choice but to negotiate a tough agreement with the ROC. Facing 
this formidable opponent, the ROC conceded to virtually every U.S. 
demand. Under such pressure could the ROC have negotiated a more 
favorable agreement? The next section analyzes the content of the 
1989 agreement and its impact on the ROC on Taiwan. It then pro-
poses possible ways which the ROC might be able to negotiate to 
reach a more equitable agreement with the United States. 
Section III: The 1989 Agreement and Possibilities for a More 
Equitable Accord 
In the 1989 fisheries talks, the United States and the ROC con-
ducted three rounds of consultations. After careful deliberation, these 
89. Meeting with Mr. Spangler, Economic Officer, American Institute in Taiwan, 
Taipei, August 12, 1989. 
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talks concluded on June 30, 1989 with a preliminary draft on the 
driftnet problem in the North Pacific. The signing of a finalized draft 
was, however, delayed until August 29 to allow both parties to discuss 
the agreement with their respective governments. Under the threat of 
an embargo on her fishery exports to the United States, the ROC on 
Taiwan reluctantly signed the agreement in Washington D.C. on Au-
gust. 26, 1989.90 
The major points of the 1989 AIT (U.S.)-CCNAA (the ROC) 
Fisheries Agreement are summarized as follows: 
1) The squid driftnet fishery is pushed further south from 40 de-
gree latitude N. to 36 degree latitude N .. 
2) At no cost to the United States, the ROC is to install auto-
matic real-time vessellocational devices (transmitter) on commercial 
driftnet vessels and transports. The installation should cover 10 per-
cent of all vessels in 1989 and reach 100 percent coverage by 1990. 
3) All harvested fish must be landed in the ROC with strict re-
strictions on at-sea transfers to transport vessels. 
4) The ROC is to introduce legislation to restrict its vessels from 
carrying both large-and small-meshed driftnet gear. All such nets are 
to be marked for identification. 
5) The ROC consents to U.S. Coast Guard boarding and inspec-
tion ("visits") of all driftnet vessels detected outside the approved fish-
ing area. Vessels inside the approved area may also be boarded, if 
under suspected fishing violations. 
6) The ROC is to introduce high seas enforcement patrol (two 
vessels for 1989 for 200 patrol days, three vessels in 1990 for 310 days) 
7) Deployment of one U.S. scientific observer in 1989. In 1990, 
the observation program will expand pending further consultation. 
8) The ROC to limit the size of her driftnet fleet in the North 
Pacific.91 
Although the agreement was to remain effective for only one 
year, it was the subject of much controversy in the ROC. The 1989 
fisheries negotiation discussed both environmental and economic is-
sues. In the ROC, however, the agreement became less of a debate 
over economic interest and conservation, but rather became a dispute 
90. American Institute in Taiwan, Annex to the Exchange of Letters between the Coor-
dinating Council for North American Ajfairs(CCNAA) and the American Institute in Taiwan 
(AfT) Regarding the high Seas Driftnet Fishing in the North Pacific by Vessels of the Terri-
tory Represented by the CCNAA, Washington, D.C., July 13, 1989. 
91. North Pacific Driftnet Fishery Negotiation, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 
Juneau, Alaska, October, 1989, attachment 2. 
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over sovereignty.92 Throughout the years of AIT- CCNAA fishing 
consultations, the United States continuously demanded the right to 
board and inspect ROC vessels for fishing violations - even if the 
vessel was in international waters. According to the 1958 High Seas 
Convention and the 1982 UN LOS Convention, vessels in interna-
tional waters are subject to the flag-state's jurisdiction. 93 In other 
words, these vessels represent the sovereign territorial extensions of 
their respective flag-states. Therefore, under these generally accepted 
conventions, a non-flag state party, in order to board a foreign vessel 
in international waters, must receive either the explicit consent of the 
vessel's captain, or the permission from the governing authority of 
that vessel's flag state. The 1989 agreement, however, permitted U.S. 
boarding on the high seas. Many people in the ROC felt that this was 
a direct violation of her sovereign rights and criticized the govern-
ment's seemingly cowardly stand against the United States. In truth, 
ROC's admitted goal in arriving at an agreement was the prevention 
of a U.S. embargo on her fishery exports. In fact, the ROC has noted 
that if the sanctions were applied, she will not be obligated to fulfill 
any part of the agreement. 94 The signing of the agreement provided 
temporary relief to American fishing interests and safe-guarded ROC 
fishery exports to the United States. 
The 1989 agreement was, in many ways, a capitulation by the 
ROC. Despite the ROC government's claim that the 1989 fishery ac-
cord was mutually beneficial, the text of the 1989 agreement proved 
otherwise. The general language of the agreement placed the majority 
of the demands and responsibilities on the ROC. In analyzing the 
main verbs used in each of the articles in the agreement, fourteen verbs 
were designated for CCNAA, five for AIT, and three for both parties. 
Throughout the agreement, CCNAA had to provide, ensure, imple-
ment, accept, introduce, install, limit, and be responsible. AIT, on the 
other hand, needed only to understand, board, and in one article, as-
sist CCNAA. The agreement was lopsided, and CCNAA had to bear 
the burden of the agreement. The only major ROC request in the ne-
gotiations was an arbitration article to enable third party mediation in 
disputes. The arbitration article was requested in July 1989, however, 
only after much public outrage in the ROC over the draft of the bilat-
eral agreement. The United States rejected the request and the agree-
92. Lincoln, Kaye, "A Quest for Profits," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 145, No. 
39, (September 28, 1989), p. 138. 
93. Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, Hans Smit, eds., Interna-
tional Law Cases and Material, St. Paul Minn: West Publishing Co., Chapter 15. 
94. North Pacific Driftnet Fishery Negotiation, supra , note 91, p. 2. 
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ment was signed without the article. The 1989 AIT -CCNAA fisheries 
accord was set on unequal footing, penalizing the ROC on Taiwan, 
and benefiting only the United States.95 
Critique of the Agreement 
The 1989 agreement not only placed the majority of the responsi-
bilities on the ROC on Taiwan, but also significantly hindered ROC 
fisheries operations in the North Pacific. It was an extremely restric-
tive agreement which may cause severe economic dislocations in the 
ROC squid industry. The following sections look at the main points 
of the 1989 agreement and analyze its adverse impact on the ROC 
fishing industry. 
Fisheries Restrictions 
One of the major objectives of the 1989 agreement was to restrict 
and control the ROC's driftnet fleet in the North Pacific. To do so, 
the United States demanded that the ROC government carry out the 
following points in the agreement: 1) move the fishery boundaries fur-
ther south, 2) limit the size of its fleet in the North Pacific, 3) restrict 
the vessels from carrying different mesh-sized driftnets, and 4) main-
tain strict at-sea transfers and make certain that all harvested fish be 
landed in the ROC. 
Boundaries restrictions clearly infringed upon Taiwan's economic 
interests in the area. In 1986, the "The Taiwan Territory North Pa-
cific Squid Fishery Operational Regulations.," which first set the fish-
ery boundaries at forty degree Latitude N., was, for example, partially 
responsible for a forty percent catch drop from 21,807 metric tons to 
13,000 metric tons.96 The present agreement to move the boundaries 
to 36latitude N. further reduced the size of the fishery and could dra-
matically decrease ROC's catch in the North Pacific squid fishery. 
Fleet size reduction could also have grave consequences on the 
ROC operations in the North Pacific. In this squid fishery, the ROC 
was consistently behind her competitors, Japan and South Korea.97 
Limiting the size of ROC's fleet thus placed her at a even greater dis-
advantage with these countries. Although the United States also re-
quested both Japan and South Korea to reduce their fleet sizes, the 
95. Annex to Exchange of Letter, supra , note 90. 
96. Kuo Tsong-hai, A Study of the Nation's Driftnet Industry, supra, note 12, p. 13. 
97. National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, The High Seas Driftnet Fisheries of the 
North Pacific Ocean. submitted to the U.S. National Section, INPFC, Anchorage, Alaska, 
September 28, 1989, chart p. 16. 
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ROC could be affected most severely because of her smaller profit 
margins. A kilogram of ROC-caught squid, for example, could only 
sell for 24 NT(the New Taiwan Dollar). In contrast, Korean and Jap-
anese squid catches can often bring 40 to 50 NT.98 The fleet restric-
tion could raise the operational cost, eliminate any profit margin the 
ROC might have now, and force the ROC to abandon the fishery 
altogether. 
Restriction on carrying multi-size meshed nets prevents the squid 
vessels from harvesting other fish in the high seas. The ROC squid 
vessels used small-meshed driftnets to harvest squid. Recently, some 
of these vessels have also began to carry large-meshed nets targeting 
albacore.99 With multi-sized nets, a vessel has increased flexibility in 
its operations. It can, for instance, harvest albacore in the area during 
the albacore season and switch to smaller nets to harvest squid during 
the squid season. The ROC government has encouraged this multi-
faceted approach as a means to increase fishery catches. 100 The 1989 
agreement's restrictions on carrying multi-sized nets clearly under-
mined ROC's strategy to expand and diversify her fisheries operations. 
At-sea transfers are a means of stream-lining fisheries operations. 
The North Pacific squid season runs for seven months from March to 
November. It would have been extremely inefficient to have the squid 
vessels return to the home port every time its storage is full. Thus, in 
order to permit the vessels to operate full-time in the fishery, fishing 
companies periodically send out transport vessels to transfer the 
catches from the squid vessels, allowing these squid vessels to continue 
their operations in the fishery. The 1989 agreement placed strict re-
strictions on at-sea transfers and mandated that all catches to be 
landed in the ROC on Taiwan. In the past, salmon poachers have 
often transferred the pirated salmon on to transports and landed them 
in a country such as Singapore, which did not have regulations against 
salmon fishing. 101 Although the 1989 restriction may close off this 
poaching channel, it also constrained the driftnet fleet's overall at-sea 
transfer operations. The transports in effect must return to the ROC 
after receiving the cargo. This will therefore not allow these trans-
ports to sail to other ports and sell the catch directly in another coun-
98. Chou Hsing-hsuen, "Solid Policies are the Fishing Industry's Guiding Light," 
Chong-kuo shih-pao, (China Times), August 10, 1989, editorial page. 
99. Kuo Tsong-hai, A Study of the Nation's Driftnet Industry, supra , note 12, p. 4. 
100. Ibid., p. 5. 
101. Pacific Seafood Processors Association, "Illegal high Seas Salmon Interception," 
supra, note 21, exhibition. 1. 
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try. The restriction interfered with this high seas operational 
flexibility, and could prove costly to the squid fishermen. 
Enforcement Schemes 
Restrictions without effective enforcement can often aggravate 
the problem at hand. In 1986, when establishing squid fishery bound-
aries, the ROC failed to put into place comprehensive enforcement 
schemes. These restrictions had, therefore, only symbolic value. The 
1989 agreement contained more comprehensive enforcement strate-
gies. In this agreement, however, the added fishery restrictions de-
manded enforcement strategies that extended beyond the available 
resources. Specifically, the 1989 accord requested 1) increased ROC 
patrol in the high seas and 2) the installation of the locational 
transmitters. 
The installation of transmitters is a clear violation of Taiwanese 
sovereignty. Transmitters are electronic locational devices which send 
out signals via satellite to a central tracking monitor. The device is 
used to track the locations of the vessels on the high seas in order to 
prevent the vessels from sneaking into the restricted fishing zones. In 
the United States, paroled prisoners are sometimes required to wear 
electronic devices to alert the law enforcement officials of their where-
abouts. Similarly, in insisting transmitters installation, the United 
States played a the role of a "high seas " police. The ROC, however, 
is a sovereign nation, not a U.S. "colony." She needed not to subject 
herself to U.S. surveillance. The proposed transmitters installation is, 
thus, unacceptable. Furthermore, the transmitters is still at an experi-
mental stage. It has not been commercialized and does not even have 
an official name. 102 The ROC, by agreeing to the installation, is serv-
ing as a guinea pig to try the efficacy of this device. 
The increase in ROC patrols has only symbolic significance. The 
North Pacific Squid Fishery is the size of the continental U.S. Intro-
ducing two to three patrol vessels will have little impact on the overall 
enforcement effort in the area. 103 The additional ROC patrol may 
shoulder some of the responsibilities with the U.S. Coast Guard and 
has jurisdiction to board her own vessels on the high seas. However, 
this small two-vessel force is a unlikely deterrent to salmon poachers. 
Increased ROC patrol is a costly operation. However, logistically, this 
102. Tsai Cheng-yuan, "Installation of Transponders, Korea and Japan both rejected, 
why do we agree," Lian-ho yuan-pao (United Evening News), July 14, 1989, p. 2. 
103. Interview with Mr. Chu Ming, Taiwan Tuna Association, August. 10, 1989. 
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increase in patrol simply can not enforce the fishery restrictions 
effectively. 
High Seas Boarding and Inspection 
The 1982 LOS Convention guaranteed the freedom of navigation 
and fishing on the high seas. It also mandated flag-state jurisdiction 
over its own vessels on the high seas. The U.S. insistence on high seas 
boarding and inspection infringed upon these rights. Although in the 
1989 agreement, the right to board and inspect was also extended to 
the ROC, there are no U.S. driftnet vessels in the North Pacific squid 
fishery. The Taiwanese patrol will, therefore, not have the opportu-
nity to board a U.S. ship. 104 This part of the agreement was, thus, far 
from reciprocal. U.S. unilateral high seas boarding and inspection 
fumed people's emotions in the ROC against "Yankee oppression."10' 
It also greatly undermined the public confidence in the ROC govern-
ment. High seas boarding may allow the United States to further her 
jurisdiction over her salmon stocks. The insistence for the extension of 
this jurisdiction however, strained the two countries' friendship. The 
Chinese public in Taiwan, in this incident, has lost a lot of faith in the 
ruling Kuomingtang Party and concurrently, increased its 'anti- Yan-
kee' sentiments. The U.S. insistence on high seas boarding not only 
caused the ROC government to loose face, but further strained the two 
countries' relations. 
ROC's Fisheries Expansion 
The ROC has not been a conservationist in her fishery operations. 
The ROC fishermen have violated both domestic regulations and in-
ternational agreements in poaching North American salmon. The 
1989 agreement tried to resolve these problems by enforcement and 
restrictions. In addition to these measures, however, the agreement 
should have considered more long-termed remedies to the fishery dis-
pute. To forge a successful fishing agreement between the United 
States and the ROC, it is crucial to understand the the ROC fishing 
industry and its problems. For years, the the ROC fishing industry has 
been a unregulated pillage on the marine environment. The govern-
ment had neither the will nor the means to regulate its fishery matters. 
The fishermen, on the other hand, have taken the opportunity to ig-
104. Chou Hsing-hsuen, "What did the Nationalist government Achieve?,"Shih-pao 
Chou-k'an,(China Times Weekly), July 15, 1989, p. 56. 
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nore the few loosely-enforced regulations, and took the opportunity to 
capitalize on the profit incentives. United States, wanting a better reg-
ulated Taiwanese North Pacific Fishery, should recognize these funda-
mental problems in the overall Taiwanese fishing industry. The ROC, 
wanting a more equitable agreement, should also stress these points. 
A Poor Agreement 
The 1989 AIT-CCNAA Fishing Agreement was an ad hoc rem-
edy to the fishery problem, designed only to fulfi11 the requirements of 
th~ Driftnet Act and to satisfy U.S. lobbying interests. As aforemen-
tioned, the CCNAA signed the agreement to avoid economic sanc-
tions. The United States, on the other hand, was satisfied that some 
sort of an accord has been reached. With both sides concerned only 
with the immediate problems, the 1989 agreement failed to explore the 
wider ramification of these disputes. Many of the articles in the 1989 
agreement were, therefore, inherently unsound. The accord placed too 
much emphasis on restrictions and enforcement, and such reliance on 
restrictions and enforcement can only temporarily ameliorate the 
problems in the North Pacific. The root problem of the dispute re-
mained largely unresolved. In other words, the 1989 agreement fo-
cused on the symptoms, not the disease. It gave temporary relief to the 
United States, but it came as a result of considerable costs to the 
ROC's fishing industry and undermined the domestic credibility of the 
ROC government. 
Possibilities for a More Equitable Accord 
Could the ROC have negotiated a more favorable accord? The 
1989 negotiation between the two countries was adversarial in nature. 
The United States felt that the ROC was taking an advantage by 
poaching salmon. The ROC, on the other hand, felt victimized by the 
U.S. restriction and regulations. International negotiations are often 
complicated compromises among different domestic, bureaucratic, and 
diplomatic forces. In the 1989 negotiation, the ROC, however, ap-
peared to have compromised to the point of out right surrender. Dur-
ing this round of fisheries negotiations, the ROC seemed have ignored 
other options and cocooned herself within the U.S. negotiation 
agenda. In spite of intense U.S. pressure, the ROC did not need to 
assume a "no-win" situation. The ROC could have negotiated a more 
equitable agreement and not compromised the main stipulations made 
by the Driftnet Act. In these negotiations, the ROC could have con-
sidered the following possibilities: 1)Active negotiator, 2) Joint negoti-
ation session with Japan and gain access to Japan's far superior 
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fisheries data, 3) Driftnet conference, 4) International fisheries man-
agement, 5) Cooperative training programs, 6) Joint-ventures, and 7) 
Joint- monitorship 
Active Negotiator 
To negotiate effectively, the ROC first has to be an active negoti-
ator. In these negotiations, the United States set the agenda and the 
ROC followed. Of all the issues discussed, the key difference was the 
question of high seas boarding and inspection. The two countries were 
stalemated on the issue, which delayed the entire negotiation process. 
High seas boarding and inspection was a matter of principle and right-
fully an important issue. Yet, it should not have overshadowed the 
overall negotiation process, where the real concerns were the eco-
nomic benefits and the resource management of the North Pacific. 
Even though the United States negotiated largely according to the 
guidelines set by the Driftnet Act, the ROC could have skirted the 
boarding stalemate by redirecting its negotiation efforts. Instead of fol-
lowing the U.S. negotiation agenda, the ROC should have composed 
her own agenda. She could have negotiated actively and influenced the 
direction or the focus of the negotiation. 
Joint Sessions with Japan 
For years, the ROC fishing industry and the ROC government 
has focused only on the numerical growth of its harvests. The ROC 
did not manage her EEZ fisheries nor did she conduct research, to any 
great detail, in her distant water fisheries. In this round of negotia-
tions, the United States had meticulous data and documented 
researches to pressure the ROC into the accord. 106 The ROC, on the 
other hand, had little data and research to substantiate her claims and 
arguments, and as a result the ROC could not be assertive. To im-
prove her negotiation position with the United States, the ROC should 
have requested a joint session with Japan. There were many advan-
tages in allying with Japan, which is the world's largest fishing nation. 
Japan had thorough documentation and data on the North Pacific 
fishery and was largely responsible for contracting ROC vessels to har-
vest salmon and squid. It was thus logical to discuss the dispute with 
the two countries jointly. Inviting Japan to the negotiation could have 
provided the ROC with a powerful ally and reduced the condemnation 
placed on ROC poaching. 
106. Interview with Mr. Tung Ih-Hsiu, Senior Specialist, The Institute of Fishery Biol-
ogy, National Taiwan University, August 29, 1989. 
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Driftnet Conference 
Asian countries are not the only driftnetters in the world. In ad-
dition to South Korea and Japan, the United States, Spain, and Italy 
also have driftnet vessels. The only major difference among these 
driftnetters is that the non-Asian countries conduct their driftnet oper-
ations inside their own EEZ, while the Asian driftnetters operate on 
the high seas. The Asian driftnetters also often deploy nets 30-40 
miles long, while the other countries use nets 1-15 miles in length. 107 
Due to the efficacy of this technology, however, countries are begin-
ning to lengthen the nets and set them in various fisheries. The 
French, for instance, have begun operations in the Bay of Biscay, and 
the Italians are driftnetting in the Mediterranean Sea for billfish. 108 
The driftnet problem is a global environmental issue. It demands inter-
national discussion and resolution. 
The ROC should not have to shoulder all the blame for the usage 
of driftnet technology. After all, many other countries are also using 
this kind of net. Furthermore, a global resolution to the problem may 
be more comprehensive than a series of bilateral agreements. The 
ROC is naive to the harms of driftnetting. In fact, according to a 
report published in 1986 by the Council Of Agriculture (COA), the 
council went so far as to encourage the use of driftnets in the coastal 
waters because "it was less destructive." 109 Because of this ignorance, 
the ROC was in no position to really argue against the United States 
on the problem of driftnet fishing. The ROC's fishery interests be-
lieved that driftnetting can be regulated to reduce its destructiveness. 
An international conference could serve as a forum for just such 
discussions. 
International Fishery Management 
Global environmental problems demand global management. 
Similarly, global resources require a global partnership. Various coun-
tries are competing for the resources of the North Pacific. To best 
allocate the available resources and maintain a sound ecological sys-
tem, countries should establish a North Pacific fishery management 
organization. The present INPFC does not include South Korea or 
the ROC, and manages only the salmon harvest in the area. In re-
107. Marlise Simmons, "Fish Nets Trap Dolphins in the Mediterranean, Too," New 
York Times, September 7, 1989, section A, p. AI. 
108. Ibid, p. Al3. 
109. Yu-yeifa-chanfan-an.(Fisheries Development Plan) Taipei, Taiwan:Council of Ag-
riculture, December 31, 1987, p. 8. 
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sponse to the U.S. pressure to limit its operations in the North Pacific, 
the ROC could counter-propose an international regime to resolve the 
resource problem in this fishery. On one level, the proposal would 
soften the U.S. insistence for the ROC to further restrict its fishery 
operations. On another level, the establishment of an international re-
gime would not only give the ROC the international de jure recogni-
tion she desperately needs, but also offer a more equitable system of 
resource allocation. The management regime is a logical long-term 
solution to the problems on the North Pacific. 
Cooperative Training Programs 
Most of ROC's high sea fishery problems are symptoms of an 
over-heated and ill-structured fishing industry. To resolve these 
problems, both the ROC's industry and government need to work to-
gether, to restructure the industry with long-termed objectives. On 
the policy level, the ROC needs a comprehensive fishery legislation 
similar to the Magnuson Fishery Management and Conservation Act 
(MFMCA) to assess, conserve, and manage her resources. On the in-
dustrial level, the government, with the assistance of the firms them-
selves, needs to put into place stronger regulation and enforcement 
schemes to control her fleets. Logistically, the government needs to 
modernize her fleets to operate more efficiently and effectively. In con-
trast, the United States has already formulated comprehensive fishery 
policies, pioneered effective fishery management plans, and con-
structed efficient fishing fleets. 110 In the context of the negotiation, 
the ROC could attempt to elicit U.S. assistance in these areas. One of 
the possible options, for example, might be to establish a fishery train-
ing or partnership program with the United States. The ROC could 
have her personnel trained under U.S. supervision, and build a modern 
fishery management foundation for her fishing industries. The ROC 
might have insisted on such programs as quid pro quo to the overall 
fishing agreement. In sacrificing some of her short-term gains in the 
North Pacific, the ROC, can still gain long-term benefits of a better-
regulated and more lasting industry. 
Joint Venture 
The United States and the ROC shared a common interest in the 
tuna fisheries. The 1989 fishery talks, however, focused only on 
driftnetting and salmon poaching. To formulate a more equitable 
110. Interview with Wu Tien-luan, assistant Editor of China Fisheries News, August 21, 
1989. 
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agreement, the ROC needs to try to expand the scope of the negotia-
tion. Although the U.S. salmon industry disliked the ROC, the U.S. 
tuna industry needed the ROC. The ROC is the second largest sup-
plier of tuna to the United States and has had a congenial relationship 
with the U.S. tuna industry. 111 The tuna industry is a traditionally 
powerful lobby, and the ROC really should have better utilized this 
ally. 112 To ease the tension in the negotiation, the ROC might have 
proposed a joint-venture with the U.S. tuna industry. This strategy 
will have brought into the negotiation a friendly lobby, agreeable to 
the State Department's "path of cooperation." In addition, the joint-
venture could have enhanced the existing partnership between the two 
countries' tuna industries. The ROC may have lost some freedom in 
her squid fishery, but she could have made up for that the loss with a 
tuna partnership. 
Joint Monitorship 
The United States played the "high sea" policemen in monitoring 
the Taiwanese squid vessels. Although the United States was, to a 
certain extent, forced into this role because of the ROC government's 
inability to regulate its own fleet, the ROC should not have permitted 
complete U.S. monitorship. For a more just set-up, the ROC could 
have insisted on joint-monitorship. The two countries could and 
should have shared the monitoring responsibilities in enforcing the 
fishery order in the area. A Chinese law professor drew the analogy, " 
Even if my child was misbehaving, I don't need you to punish him."113 
The ROC is a sovereign state. Yet, if she claims high sea jurisdiction 
over her fishing vessels, she should then take on the responsibility of 
regulating them. A joint-monitorship program with the United States 
can be the first step toward high seas self-supervision. On one hand, 
the United States will probably welcome such ROC initiative to share 
the responsibilities. On another hand, the ROC in a joint-monitor set-
up, will elevate her position to more of an equal with the United 
States. 
The 1989 agreement placed many responsibilities on an ill-pre-
pared ROC government. In the 1989 negotiation, the ROC appeared 
to have neglected many options, some of which the author has just 
proposed. Were there factors which hindered the ROC's negotiation 
111. Tsai Chien-ta, United States Fishery Policy Development and Management, supro , 
note 57, p. 4. 
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efforts? Similar to the lobbying pressure faced by the U.S. negotiators, 
the ROC negotiators were themselves under different domestic pres-
sures. The next section, section four, seeks to answer the queStion, 
why did the ROC not try harder in the negotiation? The section first 
looks at the ROC's negotiation positions and the underlying concerns 
leading to these positions. It then analyzes factors within the negotia-
tion context, which hindered the ROC's negotiation effort. Finally, 
The section concludes the overall investigation with a study of the 
linkage factors, which affected the negotiation process. 
Section IV: ROC's Poor Performance, Why? 
In theory the ROC could establish her own negotiation agenda 
and expand the scope of the negotiations. International negotiations, 
however, frequently do not produce self-benefitting outcomes. There 
exists a wide range of factors from linkage to bureaucratic competition 
that can greatly limit the options available to the negotiators. The 
1989 AIT-CCNAA fisheries negotiations resulted in an agreement 
that infringed upon ROC's economic interests in the North Pacific and 
undermined her sovereign fishing rights in international waters. This 
agreement was a great disappointment to the general public in the 
ROC, which perceived the outcome as a defeat in the government's 
diplomatic efforts. What happened at these fisheries talks? What fac-
tors influenced the ROC's negotiation expectations? Were there obsta-
cles which hindered the ROC's negotiation efforts? Although the 
negotiations took place behind closed doors and much of the details 
remained confidential, it is possible to draw reasonable conclusions 
about the ROC negotiation attitudes and expectations from the avail-
able media information, government reports, and interviews. 
This section seeks to address these questions in three stages. First, 
the section discusses and analyzes the ROC's negotiation position 
throughout the 1989 fisheries talks. It identifies three immediate con-
cerns which shaped the ROC's negotiation position: the will to protect 
her economic interests, the fear of a driftnet ban, and the desire to 
preserve her high seas sovereignty. The second stage analyzes factors 
which prevented the ROC from negotiating creatively and aggres-
sively. These factors include the absence of an appropriate negotiation 
strategy, bureaucratic noncoordination, and domestic pressure. Fi-
nally, the section examines the 1989 fisheries talks within the context 
of ROC's foreign relations, investigating possible linkage factors in the 
negotiations. The study determines that in addition to the immediate 
fisheries issues, the concern over U.S.ROC relations and the desire to 
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project a favorable international image further motivated the ROC to 
sign the agreement. · 
The United States initiated the talks on the North Pacific driftnet 
fishery. The United States, however, had no other interest in the 
marine resources of the North Pacific high seas, aside from salmon. 
Moreover, although the environmental impact of driftnetting was a 
topic of interest, the U.S. government's agitation with the technology 
actually stemmed from its frustration over the problem of salmon 
poaching in the area. In negotiations with the United States, the ROC 
clearly realized the significance of the salmon industry to the United 
States. Since 1983, the United States, has regularly discussed the 
poaching problem with the ROC. 114 In the 1989 negotiations, the 
ROC was not primarily concerned with her right to catch salmon. 
Rather, for the ROC the negotiations created a dilemma over the rela-
tive importance of economic gains as opposed to national pride. Eco-
nomically she was concerned with her fishery exports to the United 
States and with her North Pacific squid fishery. As for national pride, 
the ROC was most stubborn in resisting high seas boarding and in-
spection. The ROC's apparent uncertainty and hesitation throughout 
the negotiations were the result of this internal dilemma. 
The ROC's Negotiation Stands 
In 1989 the ROC and the United States carried out three rounds 
of fishery consultations; beginning in early February and concluding in 
late June. In the first round of negotiations, the ROC had high expec-
tations. Sensitive to her economic interests, the ROC wanted to re-
serve the right to operate freely in the North Pacific and avoid aU.§. 
trade sanction on fishery goods. Fearing an eventual ban on driftnet-
ting, the ROC declined the U.S. request to send U.S. scientific observ-
ers on ROC fishing vessels to study the driftnet technology. The ROC 
also rejected the American demand for high seas boarding and inspec-
tion on the principle of her tlag-state sovereignty on the high seas. 
Due to the last disagreement, the ROC broke-off the first round of 
negotiations. During the second round of negotiations, the ROC com-
promised her expectations and agreed to a U.S. observer program. lin 
exchange, however, she wanted to expand her fishery in the North 
Pacific. The second round faltered as the ROC refused again to allow 
U.S. boarding on the high seas. In the third and the final round of 
consultations, the ROC became extremely anxious. While aU.§. fish-
114. "Cbih-Yang No. 1, High Seas Fishing and the US-ROC Fisheries Negotiation," 
Chong-hwa yu-ye (China Fisheries News), June 5, 1989, section 4. 
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ery embargo on the ROC overshadowed the meetings, the stalemate 
over high seas boarding persisted. After ten days of contemplation, 
the ROC reluctantly agreed to the draft. Of the original expectations, 
the ROC reserved the right to driftnet in the North Pacific, though 
with further restrictions, and escaped the financial backlash of a U.S. 
fishery embargo. The ROC agreed, however, to high seas boarding 
and established a U.S. observer program. Thus, the ROC was able to 
protect her economic interests, but failed to preserve her "national 
dignity."115 
Economic Concerns 
The threat of a U.S. embargo was compelling. In 1988 the ROC 
exported more than $320 million worth of fishery products to the 
United States. 116 This export value constituted twenty five percent of 
the country's overall fishery export for 1988.U7 The squid catch was 
the most important marine fish harvest in the country. In terms of 
catch tonnage, the squid catch constituted seventeen percent of the 
overall fishery harvest in 1988. In that year the North Pacific fishery 
produced 30,000 metric tons of squid or thirteen percent of the overall 
squid catch. 118 At $1.60 per kilogram, the North Pacific squid fishery 
produced around $48 million's worth of squid. 119 From a purely eco-
nomic standpoint, the ROC government was unwilling to sacrifice 
$320 million worth of exports for the preservation of a $48 million 
fishery. The ROC was, nonetheless, also unwilling to give up a rich 
fishing ground on the high seas over which the United States, in the-
ory, had no jurisdiction. The North Pacific fishery was an expanding 
fishery which the ROC had operated profitably for almost a decade. 
She simply wanted to preserve the fruits of her labor. Under the 
threat of an embargo, the the ROC was ready to negotiate for an ac-
cord. She also, however, desired an accord that would allow her to 
driftnet as freely as possible on the high seas. 
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Fear of a Driftnet Ban 
The United States had expressed the desire to ban driftnetting 
and boycott driftnetted catch. The ROC was also aware of the con-
gressional efforts to legislate bans on the technology. The ROC feared 
that any observer program might be the first step toward a total ban 
on driftnetting. With driftnet operations in the South Pacific, North 
Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, the ROC valued her driftnet industry 
highly and was reluctant to allow U.S. scientific observers aboard. 120 
In 1988 Australia had already ejected 40 ROC driftnet vessels from 
her EEZ. 121 This recent experience has made the ROC fishery officials 
quite wary of the driftnet issue. the ROC was consequently somewhat 
hesitant in the talks with the United States, and at least initially, unco-
operative. The ROC perceived the proposed observer program as 
threat to the future of her driftnet industry. The Australian ejection 
made the ROC feel extremely vulnerable. The refusal of a U.S. ob-
server program thus stemmed from these insecurities. 
High Sea Sovereignty 
The issue of high seas boarding and inspection was as important 
as the ROC's economic interests in the fisheries talks. When the ROC 
entered the negotiations, she was resolutely against high seas boarding 
and inspection. From the very beginning, Council of Agriculture offi-
cials had repeatedly stressed ROC's "jurisdictional rights" on the high 
seas. The officials claimed, " Fishing vessels on the high seas are ex-
tensions of a nation's territory. It, therefore, is unthinkable to allow 
U.S. boarding on the high seas."122 Although many other countries, 
such as Iceland and the People's Republic of China, have all agreed to 
U.S. high seas boarding in exchange for the right to fish in the U.S. 
EEZ, the ROC was unusually adamant in her resistance to U.S. high 
sea boarding. 123 
The ROC's recalcitrance was most probably a result of her inse-
curity over her diplomatic isolation. Embroiled in the "two Chinas" 
question, the ROC is recognized by only twenty six nation-states. 124 
120. Kuo Tsong-hai, A Study of the Nation's Driftnet Industry, supra, note 12, pp. 1-5. 
121. Daniel Keith Conner and Robert O'Dell, ''The Tightening Net of Marine Plastic 
Pollution," Environment, Vol. 30, (January/February, 1988), p. 21. 
122. Chou Hsing-hsuen, What did the Nationalist Government Achieve?, supra, note 104, 
p. 56. 
123. American Institute in Taiwan," U.S. International Fisheries Agreements: Boarding 
and Inspection Practices," Cultural and Information Section, Taipei, Taiwan, August 4, 
1989, p. 2. 
124. "We Try Harder," The Economist, Vol. 313, No. 7625, (October. 21,1989), p. 34. 
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Regaining international recognition has become a major ROC foreign 
policy objective because of this diplomatic isolation. Sensitive to her 
precarious position in the global community, the ROC places a higher 
premium on her symbolic sovereignty than most other countries. 
In the negotiations, the ROC's need to uphold her "national dig-
nity" reflected her insistence upon asserting her de jure right as a sov-
ereign state. The ROC's lack of de jure acceptance in the global 
community simply made the symbolic high seas jurisdiction even more 
important to her, such that she was almost willing to risk a $320 mil-
lion trade sanction. 
Factors Which Hindered the ROC Efforts 
The ROC's negotiators formulated firm objectives, but the negoti-
ating team was unprepared and uncoordinated. The ROC had objec-
tives, but she did not devise means to reach them. Her failure to 
negotiate coherently and flexibly with the United States was the result 
of problems on three levels: strategic, bureaucratic, and domestic. In 
term of strategic problems, the ROC lacked a coherent plan to counter 
the U.S. proposals. She followed the Japanese negotiation strategy 
without considering the suitability of adopting such a strategy. In 
terms of bureaucratic problems, the ROC negotiators did not have the 
autonomy it needed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOF A) pre-
sided over the negotiation team and constricted its negotiation capabil-
ities. Finally, the ROC government cocooned herself when she 
overpublicized the sovereignty issue to the public. The resulting do-
mestic pressure in the ROC prompted her to remain resolute on the 
boarding issue, and constrained her maneuverability in the 
negotiations. 
Inflexible Negotiation Strategy 
Throughout most of the negotiation process the ROC's attitude 
seemed to be one of insecurity. She was insecure about her sovereign 
status and about U.S. intervention in her high sea fisheries. Likewise, 
the ROC's negotiation strategy was also uncertain and passive. The 
ROC's main negotiation strategy was to follow the Japanese lead and 
watch the South Koreans. In February 1989, for instance, the three 
countries agreed to self-monitorship, rejecting a U.S. proposal to send 
American observers aboard the squid vessels. When Japan agreed to 
allow 32 U.S. and Canadian observers on her vessels, however, the 
ROC began to waver. 12s The ROC's rationalization was that if Japan, 
125. "Chih-Yang No.I, High Seas Fishing," supra, note 114, section 4. 
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the fishery leader, could agree to such an arrangement, the ROC must 
also. The "follow the leader" strategy proved costly in this round of 
fisheries talks with the United States. 
Adopting positions similar to those of Japan may not have been 
wise. Although both the ROC and Japan shared a common interest in 
the squid fishery, they did not share the same kind of relationship with 
the United States, nor did they share similar domestic conditions and 
fisheries backgrounds. The ROC should study the Japanese negotia-
tion efforts, but she, should not adopt Japanese negotiation positions. 
For instance, the ROC should not have adopted Japan's position, 
stressing that driftnetting has not been proven scientifically unsound. 
Japan made this claim eloquently because she substantiated the argu-
ment with her preliminary research results. 126 The ROC's similar 
claim, however, appeared unconvincing because she had not made any 
effort to study the environmental impact of the technology. 
In adhering to a Japanese negotiation position, the ROC failed to 
explore other negotiation possibilities. When Japan yielded to a tough 
U.S. negotiation team on June 16, for example, the ROC was pres-
sured to do the same. The ROC should have developed her own nego-
tiation positions and strategy to suit her particular needs. Trying to 
employ an inappropriate strategy greatly hindered the ROC effort at 
the negotiation table. The ROC's passivity and uncertainty through-
out the negotiations stemmed partly from deferring to the Japanese 
strategy. 
Bureaucratic Noncoordination 
The ROC negotiation team consisted mainly of members from 
the Council of Agriculture (COA). The COA, however, did not have 
the complete authority in the decisionmaking process. To a great ex-
tent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), though not a key par-
ticipant at the negotiation table, authorized the negotiation 
decisions. 127 Without full authority, the ROC negotiators were un-
able to negotiate freely at the table. The bureaucratic structure thus 
thwarted the ROC negotiation efforts. 
The MOFA is a cabinet-level agency. The COA is also an agency 
with sub-cabinet status within the Executive branch of the govern-
ment. With the ROC's rapid industrialization, however, the role of 
126. Chou Hsing-hsuen, "Facing International Pressure, the Government Should Take 
Action to Solve the Problem," Chong-kuo shih- pao (China Times), June 30, 1989, p. 6. 
127. Ku Bi-ting, "Unequal Footing," Shih-pao chou-k'an, ( China Times Weekly), No. 
229 (July 15-21), 1989, p. 23. 
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agriculture has declined in the nation's economy. In contrast, as the 
ROC's ties with the United States become increasingly strained under 
mounting trade frictions, the role of the MOF A has concurrently in-
creased in its importance. Furthermore, the MOF A, actively involved 
in most of ROC's international talks, especially trade negotiations 
with the United States, has broader jurisdiction than the COA. The 
COA, thus, was obligated to compromise its authority with the 
MOF A. In the 1989 fisheries talks, the COA negotiators, in effect, 
negotiated with tied hands. According to Chiu Mao-ying, the ROC 
chief negotiator in the 1989 fisheries talks , "Issues beyond the negotia-
tion team jurisdiction was deferred to the MOF A and settled via diplo-
matic channels."128 Mr. Chiu failed to clarify what the&e "issues" 
were. It is clear, however, that the negotiation team had limited au-
thority and very likely could not negotiate as freely as it otherwise 
could have negotiated. As a result the team appeared passive and 
uncertain. 
Domestic Pressures 
The ROC maintained a tough stand on the issue of high seas 
boarding and inspection. When deciding between economic interests 
and high seas sovereignty, however, the ROC chose economic inter-
ests. The ROC realized that she could not obtain the best of both 
worlds, yet, she did not compromise till the very end. One of the ma-
jor factors in the ROC's inflexibility on the high seas boarding issue 
was clearly domestic pressure. The ROC government proudly de-
clared at the beginning of the negotiations that she was determined to 
stand tough against U.S. high seas boarding in order to protect her 
"national dignity." The public in the ROC supported this stand en-
thusiastically. When the government began to waver on the issue, 
however, the various press headlines, such as "We Should Fight on 
Legal Basis: Don't Fear," and "Taiwan Definitely Eaten by Yankees," 
reflected the intense public pressure on the negotiators to stay resolute 
on the sovereignty issue. 129 Under such pressure, it thus became 
rather difficult for the ROC's negotiators to back down from their pre-
vious statement when the talks reached a stalemate. Moreover, the 
ROC government was reluctant to disappoint the public just three 
months before the nation's first multi-party election. The strength of 
the opposition party has sensitized the ruling party to its image with 
· 128. "Visitation?Verification?Inspection?," Shih-pao chou-k'an. (China Times Weekly), 
No. 299, July 15-21, 1989, p. 53. 
129. American Institute in Taiwan, Cultural and Information Section, Media Summary, 
July 14-August 15, 1989, Taipei, Taiwan, August 11, 1989. p. 2. 
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the public. Giving up its sovereign high seas rights could have marred 
the government's image and reduced its popularity. Under these fac-
tors, the ROC was forced to remain inflexible on the sovereignty issue. 
The ROC publicized the 'national dignity• issue to the extreme, 
and failed to live up to her promises in the end. The ROC government 
did not want to lose face in ceding its high sea rights, and betray the 
public trust in the process. The high seas stalemate resulted thus 
largely from these pressures. 
Linkage Factors 
The ROC almost broke-off the 1989 negotiations. She signed the 
agreement at the last minute not because it was an agreeable accord, 
but because the consequences of nc>t signing might be disastrous. The 
COA chief negotiator, Chiu Mao-ying, stressed that, "the accord was 
signed with the country's overall benefits in mind."130 The vagueness 
of the term "overall benefit" suggested linkage factors. The ROC me-
dia, in fact, has hinted that the negotiation was actually more compli-
cated than they appeared. 
Throughout the fisheries talks, two outside factors shadowed the 
discussions, escalating international pressure and the U.S.-ROC rela-
tions. These two factors may have further restricted the ROC negotia-
tion team's ability to negotiate and forced the team to sign on an 
agreement which it did not truly support. 
International Image 
Aside from the U.S. condemnation, the ROC's driftnet fleet was 
under attack around the globe. The sixteen countries of the South 
Pacific Forum issued the Tarawa Declaration in June, which de-
manded that the ROC tuna driftnet fleet stop its operations in the 
South Pacific. 131 In 1988, the Soviet Union arrested three ROC squid 
vessels for poaching Soviet-origin salmon. 132 The Japanese salmon in-
dustry also assisted the United States in investigating ROC's poach-
ing. 133 These countries have individually exerted pressure on the ROC 
to control her fishery operations. In addition, these countries have all 
130. Ku Bi-1ing, "Unequal Footing," supra , note 127, p. 66. 
131. David Clark Scott, "15 Nations Seek Ban on Drift Nets," Los Angeles Times. July 
30, 1989, part I, p. 13. 
132. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976-Reauth. Part II, 
supra, note 36, p. 109. 
133. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976-Reauth. Part II, 
supra, note 36, p. 114. 
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assisted the United States in gathering evidence against the ROC's 
driftnetting and poaching. 
At a time when the ROC was eager to play a more active role in 
the international arena, these various problems clearly hindered her 
policy initiatives. On the one hand, of the twenty six nation-states 
who still recognized the ROC, many were located in the South Pacific. 
On the other hand, in February 1989 the first ROC trade mission ar-
rived in Moscow to establish economic ties. The driftnet dispute un-
dermined the ROC's diplomatic efforts in the South Pacific, and 
salmon poaching hampered her economic courtship of the Soviet 
Union. 
International pressure weakened the ROC stand in the negotia-
tions. The ROC, insecure over her sovereignty yet eager to play a 
more active role in the international arena, has grown more aware of 
her international image. The international opposition against the use 
of the driftnet has portrayed the ROC as a environmental polluter, 
and she was reluctant to allow the event from harming her public rela-
tions with other countries. After all, the ROC under the name "Tai-
wan, Penghu, Kinman and Matsu Customs Territory" has pursued a 
possible GATT membership and has expressed interest in joining 
OECD. 134 The driftnet dispute will not help her cause. Signing the 
agreement with the United States would reflect ROC interest in con-
serving global resources and help dispel her image as an irresponsible 
profiteer. The international anti-driftnet movement consequently 
placed further pressure on the ROC to sign the agreement with the 
United States. 
The U.S.-ROC Relation 
The following excerpts are from the New York based China 
Times Weekly 7/15-21, 1989 Special Report "Unequal Footing." 135 
A COA official, also a negotiation representative, tears 
in his eyes, spoke chokingly "At the time, I was not the only 
one in tears." 
Another representative in an oversea call said "It was 
the pressure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA), 
otherwise, it would not have been so bad." 
Another representative expressed "If the public criti-
cizes us, we can only bear the blame. Because we do not 
have the decision making authority the pressure from 'that 
134. ''The Other China is Starting to Soar,'' Business Week, (November 6, 1989), p. 62. 
135. Ku Bi-ling, "Unequal Footing," supra, note 127, p. 66. 
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side' was simply too great. If fisheries talks are linked abso-
lutely to U.S.-ROC relations, is there room for negotiation?" 
From these excerpts, it appears that the MOF A pressured the 
COA negotiation team into signing the agreement in the interest of 
U.S.-ROC relations. Although top officials in the COA repeatedly de-
nied that the MOF A was ever directly involved, the importance of 
U.S.-ROC relations in the ROC foreign relations makes this linkage 
quite probable. The ROC was dedicated to her long-standing friend-
ship with the United States, and she was also concerned with her vari-
ous trade problems with the United States. The 1989 fisheries talks 
were carried out within the context of this relationship. 
Since the Nationalist government fled mainland China in 1949, 
the United States has been the ROC's most important protector and 
partner. The United States sells millions of dollars of arms to the 
ROC annually and presently receives thirty percent of the ROC's ex-
ports. 136 Any breach in relations between the two countries could 
harm ROC's security and economy. Sensitive to this tie, the ROC has 
built a lobbying operation that is comparable in size and financing to 
those operated by Israel and Japan. 137 In the 1989 negotiations, the 
ROC was unwilling to harm this carefully nurtured relationship for a 
$48 million squid fishery or for a symbolic exercise of sovereignty. 
Despite the ROC's courtship of the United States, trade frictions 
have recently strained the two countries' relationship. Since 1980 the 
ROC has carried a trade deficit with the United States. In 1989 this 
deficit was $12 billion, a 15.1 percent increase from the previous 
year. 138 As a result, the U.S. trade representatives are constantly 
"raising hell" in Taipei. 139 Following the fisheries talks in June 1989, 
the two countries negotiated on intellectual property in September and 
agricultural products in October. With so many negotiations pending, 
the ROC did not want the fisheries talks to jeopardize her chances at 
these later negotiations. She thus felt the need to appease to the 
United States at the fisheries talks to ensure a more favorable atmos-
phere later on. The overall state of U.S.-ROC relations and the two 
countries' trade disputes made the fisheries talks an expendable "bar-
gaining chip." The MOFA consequently urged the ROC negotiators 
to accept the accord unconditionally. 
136. "Annoying Big Brother,'' The Economist, Vol. 314, No. 7637, (January 13, 1989), 
p. 68. 
137. James McGregor, "Taiwan Cultivates U.S. Support with Lobbying Force the Size 
of Israel,'' The Wall Street Joumal, November 7, 1989, p. A24. 
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By the end of 1989 the United States had signed separate bilateral 
agreements with Japan, the ROC, and South Korea. All three agree-
ments were of similar content. Relatively speaking, therefore, the 
ROC did not, thus, necessarily perform badly. 140 With both Japan and 
South Korea faltering, it is questionable whether the ROC could have 
negotiated a better accord( see Chart 1 ). One thing however is certain. 
The ROC government lost public faith and fomented domestic dissat-
isfaction on the high seas boarding debate. In both Japan and South 
Korea by contrast, the dilemma of high seas boarding was not a major 
issue. The ROC negotiators essentially overstressed the jurisdictional 
issue, which became a quagmire in the debate. The general public in 
the ROC, supporting the government's stand, felt victimized by the 
Americans and betrayed by its government's lofty promises. The 
ROC government could have avoided such controversy had it main-
tained a lower posture. If the government had not stressed and publi-
cized the jurisdictional issue so enthusiastically, the accord probably 
could have been signed without seriously undermining the govern-
ment's reputation. With increased public participation in her govern-
ment's policymaking and increased activity in the international arena, 
the ROC must engineer a new approach to her diplomacy. For the 
ROC's future negotiations, the next section looks at the possibility of 
track two diplomacy, involving non- government, non-official, infor-
mal discussion among the negotiating parties. This type of diplomacy 
could have improved ROC's negotiation efforts in the 1989 fisheries 
talks. It can also enhance ROC's negotiation efforts generally. 
Section V: Track Two Diplomacy and the ROC 
Most people are familiar with track one diplomacy. It is govern-
ment to government, official, formal interaction between instructed 
representatives of sovereign states. Track two diplomacy, less in the 
limelight, is non-governmental, informal, and unofficial in nature. 
Track two consists of interaction between private citizens or groups of 
people within a country or from different countries who are outside 
the formal governmental power structure. Track two diplomacy is not 
a substitute for track one, but may be used to support or parallel it. 141 
Track two diplomacy, in supplementing track one, provides addi-
tional options to track one and presents another arena for less-con-
140. North Pacific Driftnet Regulations, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Juneau, 
Alaska, October 1989. 
141. John W. McDonald Jr.and Diane, B. Bendahmane, eds., Conflict Resolution: Track 
Two Diplomacy, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., p. 
1. 
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strained discussions. On one hand, the objective of international track 
two diplomacy is the reduction or resolution of conflict among the 
countries by lowering the anger or fear that exists, through improved 
communication and better understanding of each other's perspectives. 
On the other hand, it is designed to assist official leaders by compen-
sating for the constraints imposed on them by the psychological need 
to appear strong and indomitable in the face of opponents. The infor-
mal and unofficial nature of track two diplomacy permits conflict 
management without public pressure. The relatively relaxed atmos-
phere of track two allows participants to talk more frankly and be 
more accommodating to each other's views. This type of diplomacy 
is, therefore, most useful when track one can not be negotiated freely 
due to public scrutiny, or if track one reaches an inextricable ideologi-
cal stalemate. 
Track two diplomacy is usually carried out in two to three in-
dependent stages. The first stage is to facilitate problem solving work-
shops or seminars among the negotiation parties. The workshop 
encourages discussion and brain-storming among the participants in 
hope of finding new approaches to track one negotiation. Stage two 
involves influencing the public opinion. In this stage, the negotiating 
parties try to influence public opinion, hoping to reduce the sense of 
being victimized of the parties and rehumanizing the image of the ad-
versary. The goal is, thus, to calm the public emotions, which may 
place serious constraints on the track one negotiation process. Stage 
three and the final stage is the establishment of economic cooperative 
programs, and does not necessarily occur in all track two diplomacies. 
The establishment of cooperative economic programs provides incen-
tive, institutions, support, and continuity to stage one and two. Coop-
erative programs, essentially, enhance any dialogue that might have 
been established in the previous talks and keeps up the informal, yet 
frank communication channels. One can see that track two diplomacy 
does not resolve the dispute or the problem. Only track one is respon-
sible for the official conflict resolution. Track two seeks only to pro-
vide alternative options, nurture a more conducive environment, and 
create and continue a more open dialogue among the parties 
involved. 142 
The ROC is a de facto state without the de jure status in countries 
not recognizing it. Even with friendly countries such as the United 
States, the ROC often lacks the diplomatic recognition necessary for 
successful negotiations. With many of her disputes, the ROC is fre-
142. Ibid., pp. 5-15. 
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quently forced to resolve the problems via unofficial and non-diplo-
matic channels. The ROC's situation is rather unique. She can not 
use track one diplomacy because her nonrecognition has restricted the 
use of this channel Instead, the ROC has to skirt this problem and 
resort to its non-official diplomatic missions. The CCNAA, for in-
stance, is a non-governmental organization, yet staffed with govern-
ment payrolled personnel The Association for East Asian Relations, 
on the other hand, is the ROC's de facto mission in Japan staffed by 
both the private sector and the government. 143 For the ROC there-
fore, track two diplomacy stands out as a valuable option for her. It 
may be the most important means of substantive diplomacy. 
The ROC has been and continues to be active in the area of inter-
national trade, finance, and development. As the world's 13th largest 
trading nation, and with the world's second biggest foreign reserve, 
the ROC's foreign relations are basically economic relations. 144 Be-
cause the private sector plays a dominant role in these international 
transactions, it is possible for the the ROC government to utilize the 
private sector as a channel for communication and negotiation. The 
ROC's diplomacy could become extremely effective through well-
strategized track two diplomacy. The government could institutional-
ize track two diplomacy and establish such channels to reinforce track 
one's short-comings. Japan's powerful conglomerates, such as Mit-
subishi and Mitsui, have, for example, established extensive interna-
tional networks around the globe. These Japanese corporations have 
often acted as liaisons for the Japanese government abroad and pro-
vided many forums for discussion. The ROC's private sector, albeit 
different from Japan's, still has extensive ties abroad. The ROC gov-
ernment should begin to take advantage of her strong private sector. 
Track two diplomacy for the ROC should become a necessary 
part of her international and domestic relations. Internationally, the 
ROC has expressed interest in rejoining international organizations 
and establishing diplomatic ties. In adopting "flexible diplomacy," 
and using her $74 billion foreign reserve, the ROC recently has re-
turned to the Asian Development Bank under the name "Taipei, 
China" and established diplomatic ties with Liberia, Barbados, Belize, 
and Grenada}45 Domestically, the lifting of Martial Law in 1987 
drastically changed the political dynamics of the country. The lifting 
of Martial Law allowed the development of opposition parties, the 
143. Chiu Hungdah, ed., Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs, Baltimore, 
Maryland: Chinese Society of International Law, Vol. 8, ( 1988-89) p. 553. 
144. ''The Other China is Starting to Soar," supra, note 134, p. 61. 
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freedom to protest and strike, and freedom of the press. 146 The tradi-
tionally "iron-fisted" central government suddenly found itself in-
volved in conflicts with a politically eager public. Government 
decisions are now under the close scrutiny of the opposition parties 
and the public. The people hold the government accountable and 
voice their concerns undaunted. This dynamic yet somewhat chaotic 
domestic situation has had significant impact on the ROC's foreign 
policymaking also. No longer can the government formulate foreign 
policies without public acknowledgment and input. Facing the new 
domestic environment and eager to carry out new initiatives in the 
international arena, the ROC has to find ways of harnessing this pub-
lic energy and find new approaches to her diplomacy. Track two di-
plomacy can fulfill these goals, domestically and internationally. It is 
a means of establishing communication channels to reduce tensions 
and find agreeable innovative resolutions to problems. The ROC gov-
ernment can utilize track two fully to enhance its decision-making ca-
pabilities in relation to domestic interest and to further its 
international efforts in gaining recognition. 
The 1989 AIT-CCNAA fisheries negotiations illustrated the 
problems and dilemma in track one diplomacy. During this negotia-
tion, the key point of conflict was the issue of high seas boarding and 
inspection. The two countries reached a stalemate early on and failed 
to explore other possibilities to the agreement. The ROC government 
was resolute on preserving her sovereign rights. The United States 
was also resolute in preserving her marine resources. In this situation, 
track two diplomacy may be useful. The ROC might have used track 
two consultations both domestically and bilaterally with the United 
States to remove some of the track one obstacles. Thorough domestic 
consultations can help the negotiators formulate a better strategy. Pri-
vate consultations with U.S. fishing interests can help reduce the ten-
sion and anger felt on all sides. 
The ROC exported $320 million worth of fishery goods to the 
United States in 1988. Of this amount, around $100 million were tuna 
exports. 147 The two countries, thus, shared fishery interests, espe-
cially in the tuna industry. The adversarial atmosphere of the 1989 
negotiation hindered the negotiation process and, in the end, strained 
U.S.-ROC relations. Facing this problem, efforts on the track two 
level involving the fishing industries of both countries, environmental-
146. "The Bare Facts," The Economist, Vol. 313, No. 7628, (November 18,1989), p.37. 
147. Interview with Mr. Chu Ming, Chairman of the Taiwan Tuna Association, Taipei, 
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ists and other fishery scholars could have smoothed the way for a fish-
ery accord. 
With the 1989 negotiation, domestic consultation with the fishing 
industry in the ROC did not really begin until after the February 
round of the negotiation. The ROC media, with its newly founded 
freedom of press, also began lavish front page articl~ on the consulta-
tion process. Mr. Wu Tien-luan, assistant editor of the China Fishery 
News, criticized the government in that " ... [i]t did not prepare well 
to go into the negotiation and failed to consult with all sectors of the 
industry."148 Mr. Chu-Ming of the Taiwan Tuna Association criti-
cized the media, on the other hand, for " ... helping the Americans by 
making high seas boarding such a major issue, evoking unnecessary 
emotions in the country."149 Due to the lifting of martial law in 1987, 
the ROC government's decision-making can no longer be isolated 
from public opinion. In the 1989 negotiations, the salmon/driftnet is-
sue evolved from a commercial dispute into a political stalemate. The 
media further enfiamed the domestic emotions by stressing the loss of 
sovereignty in permitting U.S. boarding. If the ROC government had 
utilized track two consultations, however, the issue might have re-
mained a commercial issue and evoked less media sensationalism and 
public emotions. 
What would a track two scenario look like for the 1989 U.S.-
ROC fishery talks? A rough sketch of this possibility is outlined 
below: 
Domestically, the ROC government should establish communica-
tion channels among all interested parties in before the negotiations in 
the following order: 1) Joint conferences between the government and 
the fishing industry behind closed doors; 2) Open forum between the 
government, the industry, the media and academia; and 3) Form a 
special task force with members from the COA and the fishing indus-
try to monitor the negotiations. 
The joint conference would be designed to allow frank discussions 
between the industry and the government. In the conference, the par-
ticipants should not only try to establish the negotiation position, but 
also prioritize objectives to allow room for compromise. The meeting 
would be confidential to allow more open exchanges. The open forum 
is an information session, but also a workshop for brain-storming op-
portunities. The primary goals would be to find new approaches to the 
148. Interview with Mr. Wu Tien-1uan, Assistant Editor of the China Fisheries News, 
Taipei, Taiwan, August 23, 1989. 
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fishery talks and eliminate any public misunderstandings. The special 
task force would continue the established domestic discussions and ad-
vise the negotiators throughout the actual negotiation process. This 
task force should remain autonomous from the government's bureau-
cratic structure and have the option to assist the negotiators directly. 
The domestic track two preparations can help the ROC to formulate a 
more coherent strategy and lessen the m¢ia clamor. The ROC nego-
tiators, through this series of planning and discussion, can grow more 
assertive and aggressive in the fishery talks. 
Internationally, track two is carried out on three fronts: 1) 
CCNAA to lobby with its available resources in the congress,.2) to 
facilitate communication between the ROC fishing industry and the 
U.S. salmon interest with the U.S. tuna industry as the mediator, and 
3) to hold fishery conferences in both the ROC and the northwest 
United States to facilitate understanding between the fishery interests 
from both countries 
The CCNAA's lobbying organs in the United States rival that of 
Israel and Japan. With this round of negotiation, CCNAA really 
should use its power-brokers or lobbyists to pacify the emotions of the 
Northwest. The U.S. Congress is susceptible to lobbying. The ROC 
should use her grass-roots lobbying power to sway congressional opin-
ions. The tuna industry lobbied for the ROC during the 1989 negotia-
tion. However, the industry could play a key mediating role between 
the U.S. salmon interest and the ROC squid fleet. Meetings between 
the Chinese from Taiwan and the Americans allow direct discussions 
and open up the possibilities for compromise. The North Pacific fish-
ery dispute was a commercial and environmental issue. A meeting 
between just the fishing industries skirts the extraneous political con-
siderations. Finally, conferences and visits on both sides of the Pacific 
can really help the fishing industries understand the severity of the 
problem. When the ROC fishery business sees the salmon hatcheries, 
it will realize the American efforts in preserving salmon stock. When 
the American salmon interest sees the chaotic harbors in the ROC, it 
may also understand the ROC problem of regulation and manage-
ment. With this kind of visual and verbal communication, both sides 
may be persuaded to amend individual positions to compromise their 
demands. 
Track two diplomacy can make a difference in the negotiation. 
The ROC, through track two, can consolidate domestic efforts and 
reduce tensions with the United States. With track two, the ROC is 
certain to negotiate a more equitable agreement for herself. 
The North Pacific fishery dispute exemplifies, to a certain extent, 
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general structural problems in the ROC's fishing industry, mainly its 
lack of regulation and outdated government fishery policies. The 
1989 U.S.- ROC fishing negotiation reflected some of the continual 
weaknesses in the ROC's negotiation position, specifically, her diplo-
matic isolation and her self- insecurity. Track two diplomacy would 
have been useful in the 1989 fishery talks. However, the general con-
cept of track two diplomacy can really be applied to the ROC interna-
tional relations as a whole. The ROC has long been dissatisfied with 
her international status. Although considered a strong economic 
power, the ROC has received second class treatment around the 
world. In the United States, the ROC diplomats are not allowed to 
enter the State Department or the White House. 150 In Europe, the 
Europeans treat the ROC diplomats with indifference. For the ROC, 
her de jure status does not at all reflect her de facto role and contribu-
tion to the global community. Without the means to play track one 
diplomacy, the ROC should apply track two diplomacy whenever pos-
sible and may even, at times, give track two priority over track one. 
With the United States, the ROC has already practiced track two 
diplomacy to a certain extent. Instead of building friendships in the 
White House or the State Department, the ROC has turned to sena-
tors and congressmen, state legislators, mayors, journalists, and corpo-
rate chiefs. This grass-roots strategy has resulted in, for example, 
eighteen states having trade offices in the ROC and 138 cooperative 
programs with U.S. universities. 151 Although the ROC has been suc-
cessful in this aspect, the government still carries out most of these 
track two initiatives. These courtships are, therefore, still official gov-
ernment operations with its bureaucratic constraints. The ROC, with 
its booming economy and flourishing entrepreneurial class, could be-
gan to encourage the private sector to take on the track two initiatives. 
This strategy will allow more diplomatic flexibility and establish even 
more communication channels for the government. 
The time is ripe for a major push for track two diplomacy in the 
ROC. This, in fact, may apply to Asian Newly Industrialized Coun-
tries (NICs) in general. With their booming economies, these coun-
tries, though small, are powerful economic engines and can exert 
global influence with their economic successes. For the ROC, the 
move toward globalization is even more pronounced. Her private sec-
tor, since 1987, has begun to invest extensively overseas and begun to 
150. James McGregor, "Taiwan Cultivates America's Support," supra, note 137, p. 
A24. 
151. James McGregor, ''Taiwan Cultivates America's Support," supra, note 137, p. 
A24. 
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globalize its strategies. The world is beginning to realize the strength 
of these the ROC businesses. The Evergreen Corporation, Acer Com-
puters and Mitac International are just a few of the ROC's leading 
multinationals. In 1989, the ROC private sector and the government 
tabled a plan to establish fifty to one hundred ROC global brands. 152 
While the government help the private sector globalize, it can also 
work with the private sector in setting up channels for track two diplo-
macy. The ROC can and should use the strength of her private sector 
to compensate for her diplomatic weaknesses. Track two diplomacy 
can enhance the ROC's international de facto standing and further her 
efforts in raising her de jure status. 
Conclusion 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOS Convention) skirted the resource allocation dilemma by 'priva-
tizing' the coastal seas. Recalling that these coastal EEZ's contained 
around ninety percent of the global marine resources, it is not difficult 
to imagine the sudden resource shortage many distant water fleets now 
face. 153 Although the LOS Convention encouraged coastal nations to 
share their marine resources with other nations, such idealism re-
mained only valid on paper. Furthermore even with EEZ's, resource 
disputes persisted. The long-standing U.S.-Canada fishing dispute 
over the resources of the St. George's Bank, for instance, has resulted 
in the Canadian Coast Guards firing on U.S. fishing vessels. 154 The 
high seas boarding of the U.S. Coast Guard on the ROC squid vessels 
is an example of yet another dispute over resources. Nations are com-
peting for the available marine resources. The global common, free 
and inexhaustible, is now a fairy tale from the past. 
International disputes over fishing rights are common. Many 
countries ignore international law in face of profit. The United States 
condemned the the ROC fishermen for intercepting salmon on the 
high seas. However, just two years ago, the Kingdom of Kiribati in 
the South Pacific similarly detained several U.S. tuna vessels for fish-
ing violations in her EEZ. Rather than abiding by international law 
and paying the fine, the United States, in retaliation, cut all aid to 
Kiribati. 155 International law of the Sea was designed to maintain 
152. "A Brand by Any Other Name is not as Sweet," Sinorama, (November 1989), p. 
14. 
153. Hsieh Ta-wen, New Sea Order and International Fishery Management, supra, note 
5, p. 46. 
154. Cable News Network, "Headline News," Atlanta, July 29, 1989. 
155. "Fisheries in Crisis," Pacific Islands Monthly, (December 1988), p. 44. 
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some sort of order in the ocean common. Unfortunately, nations often 
use the law as a "Law of Convenience." The United States quoted 
from the law when the ROC poached salmon. When U.S. fishermen 
violated the laws, however, the United States conveniently ignored the 
law. International negotiation on the basis of international law is re-
ally a power game. The stronger nation often prevails over the weaker 
nation regardless of validity of the law. Thus, when negotiating with a 
stronger opponent, the weaker nation should prepare to negotiate on 
the basis of skill, not on the basis of international justice. When the 
ROC on Taiwan refused high seas boarding on the basis of the tradi-
tion of high seas jurisdiction, the United States claimed philosoph-
ically that "the right to agree to high seas boarding and inspection is 
itself an exercise of sovereignty." The United States then threatened a 
fishery boycott and obtained an agreement. International law of the 
sea is only a tool of convenience for the powerful. The ROC on Tai-
wan should never have depended on it. The ROC was already on the 
defensive because of the evidence against her poaching. To make mat-
ter worse, the ROC government negotiated passively with the United 
States. The ROC's negotiation passivity and her dependence on inter-
national law frustrated her attempts for a more equitable agreement. 
Despite the ROC's less than satisfactory performance in the fish-
ery talks, the 1989 AIT-CCNAA fisheries negotiations provided im-
portant lessons to her future international dealings. Even when 
negotiating with a strong opponent like the United States, the ROC 
need not assume an automatic "no-win" situation. Although the fish-
ery talks exposed many of the ROC's weaknesses in negotiating with 
the United States, these weaknesses were also prevalent in her negoti-
ations in general. 
In the negotiations, the ROC failed to prepare thoroughly for the 
negotiation. The lack of coordination among the government agencies 
and the lack of communication with the domestic interests prevented 
her from formulating a coherent strategy in the negotiations. Already 
disadvantaged as a small nation, the ROC can not afford to negotiate 
in disunity. For future negotiations, the ROC must first coordinate 
her strategies among all domestic parties. 
Furthermore, the ROC maintained lofty goals and failed to pri-
oritize them. The the ROC government stressed its conviction to 
stand by the non-high seas boarding principle. However, when the 
United States refused to compromise on the issue, the ROC failed to 
unlock the stalemate. To increase maneuverability in negotiation, the 
ROC must attempt, before the negotiation, to identify, assess, and pri-
oritize her objectives. The ROC should first set realistic goals and as-
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sess their importance. In addition, she should not publicize these 
objectives early on, in case she fails to reach them and disappoints the 
public. Finally, with prioritization, the ROC gives herself more flexi-
bility in the negotiation, avoiding situations such as the sovereignty 
stalemate. 
Moreover, the ROC was a passive negotiator in the 1989 fishery 
negotiation. Under the U.S. shadow, the ROC negotiators failed to 
negotiate aggressively. The ROC is not yet an international power. 
However, with her economic strength and increased global interdepen-
dence, the ROC could be more assertive. The ROC should take ad-
vantage of the increased global interest in global cooperation, ranging 
from aid programs to conservation. The ROC should become more 
active in negotiation efforts, establish her own agendas instead of fol-
lowing others, and initiate discussions rather than be forced into them. 
The ROC essentially should avoid being on the defensive all the time. 
Finally, the 1989 fishery negotiations illustrated the importance 
the ROC placed on her sovereignty. The ROC's insecurity over her 
diplomatic status has hindered her negotiation efforts. In order to 
play a more active role in the international arena, the ROC needs to 
overcome this insecurity. In a negotiation context, the ROC should 
focus less on the de jure recognition issue. Instead, she should negoti-
ate flexibly with her de facto strengths. With time, the world will have 
to come to accept the ROC's strengths. Dogmatic adherence to de 
jure sovereignty can only hinder the ROC's efforts in international 
negotiations. 
The ROC has survived four decades under the U.S. alliance. 
With her increased wealth, the ROC has become more independent 
and eager to venture into the global arena on her own. In Janurary 
1990, the ROC officially forwarded her application to join GATT 
under the name "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinman and Matsu Customs Terri-
tory."156 In 1989, the ROC established a $1.4 billion fund to aid third 
world countries. 157 With her GATT application, the ROC had ini-
tially requested U.S. support for her entrance into the organization. 
When the United States hesitated due to pressure from the People's 
Republic of China, however, the ROC decided to go ahead with the 
application under a flexible name anyway. 158 This incident illustrated 
a change in the the ROC's foreign policy. The United States is still 
156. Ku Bi-ling, "The First Move in the Ninety's,"Shih-pao chou- k'an, (China Times 
Weekly) No. 255, January 13-19, 1990, pp. 56-51. 
157. "The Other China is Starting to Soar," supra, note 134, p. 62. 
158. Ran-liang, "We should let Taiwan Join GATT," Shih-pao chou-k'an (China Times 
Weekly), No 255, January 13-19, p. 59. 
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her most important ally, but ROC diplomacy has begun to emerge 
from the U.S. shadow. 
On a brighter note, the experience of the 1989 fishery talks has 
already served as a foundation for future changes and refinements. In 
March 1991, the ROC agreed to extend the fisheries accord for one 
more year. However, this time, it did succeed in getting the United 
States to agree to joint boarding and inspection, hence, reclaiming 
some of the ROC's sovereign rights. Before this agreement expires in 
June 1992, both countries will continue to discuss and monitor the 
content of the agreement. The ROC may therefore have further op-
portunities to amend the present accord into a more cooperative one. 
In order to succeed in new diplomatic initiatives, the ROC must 
reorient her approaches to international negotiations. The 1989 Fish-
eries Negotiations demonstrates that the ROC still needs substantial 
changes in her negotiations. In learning from her mistakes, the ROC 
will surely achieve better results in future negotiations. 
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